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ABSTRACT 
 
Advanced tests of Theory of Mind (ToM) have offered support for the ToM model 
of ASD with adults with High Functioning Autism Spectrum Disorder (HF ASD). 
Other support for the ToM model of ASD has arisen from research incorporating 
video and audio elements to improve the real-life applicability of ToM tests for 
adults with HF ASD. Building upon this research, the current study develops a 
new measure of Theory of Mind (ToM) that adopts a game-like design that is both 
challenging and engaging for adults with HF ASD: The Friendship Game (TFG).  
 
The thesis documents the initial development of TFG, followed by an exploratory 
quantitative and qualitative validation of TFG. Eight participants with HF ASD 
were recruited to the study. Their individual performances on TFG were 
compared to their performances on Cognitive and Social Cognitive Assessments 
and self-report measures, relative to UK norms. The participants’ verbal 
responses in TFG were explored to assess perceived evidence of ToM 
application and accuracy. The participants also provided feedback on the testing 
experience to further assess TFG’s validity and relevance to the adult HF ASD 
population. 
 
The results provided initial support for TFG’s validation as a new measure of ToM 
for adults with HF ASD. Exploration of the participants’ verbal responses suggest 
that there was no evidence of floor or ceiling effects in TFG. Participant feedback 
also indicated that the TFG is both an engaging and challenging test of ToM. 
Whilst they reflected that social interaction is more complex in everyday life, TFG 
helped to identify and prompt a discussion around these difficulties. Ideas for how 
TFG could be developed into an intervention to support adults with HF ASD were 
also discussed. 
 
The findings of the study were discussed in relation to previous research and 
ideas for future directions. The study’s methodological and theoretical limitations 
were also explored. For example, the impact of the small participant size on the 
conclusions that can be draw from of the study. Also, the contextual challenges 
involved in the validation of a new measure of ToM.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Autism Spectrum Disorder 
 
The diagnosis: Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is descriptive of a dyad of 
impairments: deficits in social Interaction and communication and; evidence of 
restrictive and repetitive interests and heighted sensory differences (American 
Psychiatric Association (APA), 2013). As it is the latest diagnostic definition within 
the DSM 5, ASD will be the terminology referred to throughout this thesis. There 
will also be reference to the more generic term of Autism, in order to 
acknowledge the historical and cultural evolution of the ASD diagnostic label.   
 
1.1.1 Deficits and descriptions of ASD 
In the 1940s two different conceptualisations of Autism were developed. In 
Austria, Asperger’s account of ‘autistic psychopathology’ was based upon a 
group of children whom he observed to have an array of talents combined with 
deficiencies in social relationships, peculiarities in social communication, 
obsessional interests and rigid, repetitive behaviours (Asperger, 1944; Frith, 
1991b). A year before Asperger’s publication, Kanner; an influential child 
psychiatrist based within the United States, published a different account of 
Autism. Due to his status within the medical field, Kanner would choose to work 
almost exclusively with young children on the extreme end of the spectrum of 
cognitive and linguistic impairment (Silberman, 2015). Kanner’s paper, being 
published in English as opposed to German, generated a lot more early research 
interest than Asperger’s (Frith, 1991b). This subsequently led to his 
conceptualisation being more influential in how autism was originally shaped to 
be a condition emerging in early childhood with traits of significant intellectual, 
communicative and social impairment (Kanner, 1943).  
 
Within the early 1980s, Wing challenged Kanner’s conceptualisation of Autism, 
by proposing that it was a spectrum condition also affecting those with high 
intellect (Wing,1988;1979). Her description of an ‘Autism Spectrum’ was more in 
line with Asperger’s original account of the condition, but differed from his view 
15 
 
that it was separate condition to Kanner’s account of Autism (Frith, 1991a). 
Instead, she argued that both conditions lay on a continuum. Her work led to 
Asperger’s syndrome being introduced into the DSM-IV as a subcategory of 
Autism. The new diagnostic category described individuals who had intellectual 
strengths but whose significant difficulties with: social interaction; communication 
and restrictive, repetitive interests resulted in great challenges in everyday 
functioning.  
 
Wing’s work was also a key influence in how Autism came to be understood as 
‘Autism Spectrum Disorder’ (ASD) within the APA, DSM-5 (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). To be diagnosed with ASD, one must be assessed to meet 
diagnostic criteria across two axes:  
 
• A: Evidence of deficits in social Interaction and communication  
• B: Evidence of restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviours, activities 
and/or interests and hyper or hypoactivity to sensory input. 
• Both should be present since childhood, persistence across multiple 
contexts and result in limits/impairments of everyday functioning.  
 
1.1.2. Contemporary Diagnostic Features 
Prior to the introduction of the DSM-5, there were disputes regarding whether an 
Autism diagnostic category would benefit from being ‘spilt’ into multiple 
subcategories or ‘lumped’ into one overarching category (Tsai & Ghaziuddin, 
2014; Waterhouse, London, & Gillberg, 2016). Former diagnostic labels of Autism 
have ‘split’ Autism Spectrum Disorder (APA, 1991) into the sub-categories of: 
Autistic Disorder (AD); Asperger Syndrome (AS) and Pervasive Developmental 
Disorder- not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS). However, it was later argued that 
there were more similarities than differences between the categories, thus 
bringing their diagnostic validity into question (Lord et al., 2012; Waterhouse et 
al., 2016). As such, the DSM 5 ‘lumped’ the DSM IV Autism subcategories into 
the single diagnostic label of ASD (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The 
DSM 5 emphasis on ‘spectrum’ identifies ASD as being a heterogeneous 
condition consisting of variations across language and intellect. 
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Unfortunately, the change in the diagnostic criteria caused controversy amongst 
those within the ASD population. Individuals previously diagnosed with AS had 
taken pride in the identity of ‘Aspie’ and were therefore upset at the news of its 
removal (Attwood, 2006; Ryu & Han, 2016). Some individuals with AS were also 
concerned that this label would result in people associating them with having a 
lower level of intellectual functioning (Linton, Krcek, Sensui, & Spillers, 2013). On 
the other hand, individuals who had been previously diagnosed with AD were 
offended by the insinuation that they were lower functioning than those with AS, 
and that being categorised together was something to be ashamed of (Linton et 
al., 2013). Individuals with ASD are now grouped according to intellect; those with 
a diagnosed learning disability would be considered low functioning (LF ASD) 
and those without a learning disability would be considered high functioning (HF 
ASD). Due to the limited scope of the thesis, adults with HF ASD will be the focus 
of the current study.  
 
1.1.3. Adults with High Functioning ASD 
The challenges faced by adults with HF ASD have often been minimised, 
underrepresented and under-researched (Tantam, 1991, 2014). The research 
conducted with this population indicates that adults with Autism have fewer 
friendships and involvement in recreational activities than those without a 
diagnosis of Autism (Orsmond, Kraus, & Seltzer, 2004). In addition to this, 
research from the National Autistic Society found that 70% of autistic adults told 
them that they would like more support in order to feel less isolated (Rosenblatt, 
2008). Another study found an association between Autistic adults having fewer 
friends and having high scores on low self-esteem, anxiety and depression on 
range of mood measures (Mazurek, 2014).  This research therefore highlights the 
need for further research into methods of supporting the needs of the high 
functioning adult ASD population.  
 
1.1.5. Epidemiology  
In 2017, it was estimated that the prevalence of ASD in developed countries 
around the world is 1.5% (Lyall et al., 2017). In 2012, it was also estimated that 
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there are around 700,000 people on the Autistic Spectrum in the UK, which if 
including their families, affects around 2.8 million people (Brugha et al., 2012).  
 
In 2012, the Centre for Disease Control reported a 78% increase in incident rates 
of Autism in 8 year olds from 2004-2008 (Taylor, Jick, & Maclaughlin, 2013). The 
increase in diagnostic rates over the years has been attributable to a number of 
factors. Firstly, changes in diagnostic criteria to ASD (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013), has made it more likely for individuals to be diagnosed (King 
& Bearman, 2009).  Secondly, an increase in awareness of Autism over the years 
has made schools and GP’s more likely to recognise Autism and refer individuals 
for a diagnostic assessment (Heidgerken, Geffken, Modi, & Frakey, 2005). 
Thirdly, more adults are now being diagnosed with ASD (Lord, Elsabbagh, Baird, 
& Veenstra-Vanderweele, 2018).  
 
1.1.6. Sex 
Historically, more males have been diagnosed with Autism in comparison to 
females, with early estimates of the gender ratio being around four males to one 
female (Wing, 1981). This ratio has led to a number of theories of Autism being 
developed, such as Baron-Cohen’s: Extreme Male Brain Theory of ASD (Baron-
Cohen, 2010). More recently, this sex difference has been estimated to be closer 
to 3:1 (Loomes, Hull, & Mandy, 2017). These findings suggest that women have 
been under diagnosed, diagnosed late or misdiagnosed (Ferri, Abel, & Brodkin, 
2018). Autism being less diagnosed in women has also led to fewer female 
research participants in ASD research (Loomes et al., 2017). This in turn has 
resulted in there being less understanding about how ASD presents itself in 
women. For example, research has since demonstrated that women with ASD 
are more likely than men to mask their symptoms in a process known as 
‘camouflaging’ (Dean, Harwood, & Kasari, 2017), which is suggested as a reason 
for why features of ASD are more difficult to recognise in women in comparison 
to men (Kreiser & White, 2014). 
 
1.1.7. Co-Morbidity 
It has been reported that 54% of adults diagnosed with ASD were also diagnosed 
with a co-existing mental health disorder; 29% with a diagnosis of an anxiety 
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disorder and 26% with a diagnosis of depression (Croen et al., 2015).  The high 
rates of anxiety in the ASD population have been linked directly to the ASD 
symptoms; such as distress about changes in routine and heightened sensitivity 
to sensory stimuli (Gillott & Standen, 2007). Research has also demonstrated 
that ASD features interact bi-directionally with mental health conditions (Fodstad, 
2019). In addition to this, research has shown that heighted physiological arousal, 
combined with deficits in social interaction and communication, increases the 
likelihood of individuals with ASD experiencing anxiety when faced with 
interpersonal and/or environmental stressors (Bellini, 2006). Research has also 
shown that adults with ASD, who have a higher level of language skills and 
independence, were more likely to report symptoms of depression due to the 
increased perception of the disparity in their social skills compared to their 
‘neurotypical’ peers (Hedley & Young, 2006; Sterling, Dawson, Estes, & 
Greenson, 2008).  
 
1.1.8. Cross-Cultural Issues 
Whilst there have been relatively few cross-cultural ASD studies to date, the 
limited research has demonstrated a number of cross-cultural differences in ASD 
diagnostic rates. For example, one major cross-cultural study found that the UK 
endorses a higher level of symptom severity in comparison to Israel on the same 
screening measure. One explanation for this was due to there being a different 
conceptualisation of developmental milestones in the two countries. Research 
has also demonstrated that the extent to which having a diagnosis of ASD is 
stigmatised in a country, influences the likelihood of it being diagnosed.  For 
example, in South Korea it was found to be more stigmatising to receive a 
diagnosis of ASD than a diagnosis of attachment disorder, due to ASD being 
considered untreatable (Kang-Yi, Grinker, & Mandell, 2012). Research has also 
shown that access to diagnostic services within a country also influences cross-
cultural differences in diagnostic rates (Honda, Shimizu, Imai, & Nitto, 2005).  
 
Be this as it may, there are a number of limitations with cross-cultural Autism 
research. Firstly, the majority of cross-cultural research is based upon ASD 
diagnostic criteria and assessment tools that have been developed within a 
Western Context and subsequently translated. This arguably fails to account for 
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the nuances in behavioural manifestations of ASD across countries. For example, 
Lotter (1978) found that non-verbal children with Autism in Africa (Ghana, 
Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa) were more likely to engage 
in ‘unusual water carrying movements’ and ‘banging’, whereas English children 
were more likely to demonstrate ‘flapping and self-injurious behaviour’. Research 
has also demonstrated that there are different cultural interpretations of 
diagnosable Autism characteristics. For example, in countries such as the UK 
and USA, not making eye contact during social exchanges is considered rude 
and is likely to be why this is considered a key diagnostic feature of ASD 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). However, emphasis on this feature 
may also create a cultural prejudice against countries that avoid eye contact out 
of respect for their elders (Wheeler, 2011).  
 
1.1.9. Limitations of the Medical Model approach to ASD 
As discussed, to have a diagnosis of ASD one would need to demonstrate 
evidence of having a ‘deficit’ in social communication and interaction skills 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Using this premise to assess whether 
someone has a diagnosis is rooted within the medical model approach (Kapp, 
Gillespie-Lynch, Sherman, & Hutman, 2013). The medical model has been 
criticised for applying a deterministic framework to considering whether someone 
has a neurodevelopmental disorder (Laurelut et al., 2016). Akin to diagnosing an 
illness, the diagnostic process locates the ‘problem’ within the individual 
(Shyman, 2016). This is problematic, because the ASD aetiology is a complex 
mix of culturally bound environmental and biological influences (Mandy & Lai, 
2016), rather than something that can be identified via a blood test.  
 
Be this as it may, it is important to note that a diagnosis of ASD can also offer an 
individual and/or their family crucial access to legal frameworks supporting their 
rights. For example: access to an educational statement for educational support; 
access to a social care assessment for support with social care needs and a 
method of identifying with other individuals who share the same diagnosis (The 
National Autistic Society, 2019).   
 
1.1.10. Current ASD policy 
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The Autism Act (2009) was established in England after two years of 
campaigning from The National Autistic Society. It is the first piece of legislation 
that specifically supports individuals with Autism (The National Autistic Society, 
2019).  The Act resulted in the launch of the first Autism Strategy titled: ‘Fulfilling 
and Rewarding Lives Strategy’. A review of this strategy with service users, 
parents, carers and professionals resulted in the development of ‘Think Autism’ in 
2014 (Department of Health, 2014).  
 
The key points from the strategy included:  
• Increasing Autism Awareness  
• Developing pathways to address the needs of adults with ASD, such as 
supporting the identification of an implementation of reasonable 
adjustments within places of employment. 
•  Improving the access to and reliability of the Autism diagnostic 
assessment process. 
 
Since the strategies have been released, around 93% of the areas in England 
now have an adult diagnostic service and since last year, the strategy has been 
extended to children (The National Autistic Society, 2019).  
 
Despite the many achievements, people are still waiting lengthy times to receive 
a diagnostic assessment of ASD and are being denied assessments of their 
social care needs (Public Health England, 2017). In order to address these 
factors, the National Autistic Society has been working with the All Party 
Parliamentary Group on Autism to review the successes and pitfalls of The 
Autism Act, as well as identifying areas for further development (The National 
Autistic Society, 2019). 
 
1.1.11. Aetiology 
In the early 1920s psychodynamic theories were the most popular explanations 
of the causes of Autism (Wolff, 2004). Psychogenic theories of ASD were 
accepted across the medical field due to the lack of medical research in to the 
causes of ASD at the time (Feinstein, 2011). Researchers who supported the 
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psychogenic explanation of ASD believed that Autism was caused by a lack of 
parental warmth resulting in extreme withdrawal of the child (Kanner, 1949).  The 
‘Refrigerator Mother’ explanation of Autism was coined by Kanner (1949) and 
popularised by Bettelheim, who was a well know psychiatrist at the time 
(Feinstein, 2011). Bettelheim’s influence was responsible for the launch a range 
of Autism treatments, one of which included the separation of Autistic children 
from their parents to live in a residential facility (Pollak, 1997). In the 1960’s, the 
psychogenic explanations of Autism became less popular and research shifted 
towards biological understandings of ASD (Wolff, 2004). For example, many 
researchers considered Autism to be an early form of childhood schizophrenia 
(Eisenberg & Kanner, 1956), however, this idea was abandoned by the late 70s 
(Kolvin, 1971). Other researchers explored the association of Autism with 
neurodevelopment disorders (Bartak, Rutter, & Cox, 1975) and with medical 
conditions, such as Rubella (Chess, 1977).  
 
Currently, theories about the causes of ASD have span from purely genetic 
(Caglayan, 2010; Geschwind, 2011; Lichtenstein, Carlström, Råstam, Gillberg, & 
Anckarsäter, 2010; Muhle, Trentacoste, & Rapinaefer, 2016; Warrier, Baron‐
Cohen, 2017; Woodbury‐Smith, & Scherer, 201, 2004; Sch 8; Yuen, Szatmari, & 
Vorstman, 2019) to purely environmental (Grabrucker, 2013; Hertz‐Picciotto, 
Schmidt, & Krakowiak, 2018; Landrigan, 2010; Patel et al., 2018; Rodier & 
Hyman, 1998). More recently, there has been a growth in research looking at the 
interaction of genetic and environmental factors as a cause of ASD (Hegarty et 
al., 2019). In a review of this area by Mandy and Lai (2016), it was discussed that 
ASD has a strong genetic component. However, there is also evidence to 
suggest that prenatal, perinatal and postnatal factors influence the emergence of 
ASD and its developmental course.  
 
Research looking into the causes of ASD has strived to find targeted 
interventions that will help to reduce the intensity of the presentation upon daily 
functioning (Veenstra-Vanderweele & Blakely, 2012). However, some authors 
have contested research looking into Autism aetiology, raising ethical concerns 
that this information might be used to pursue eugenic practices (Pellicano & 
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Stears, 2011). Others have also raised concerns that genetic and environmental 
aetiological research places too much emphasis on Autism being a disorder and 
therefore dismisses strengths held in the ASD population and value of 
neurodiversity (Baron-Cohen, 2009; Treffert, 2014).  
 
1.2. Psychological Theories of ASD 
 
1.2.1. History and Background 
Within the 1920’s, psychologists became interested in social cognition and 
individual differences (Deary, 2001). During this time, the psychometric approach 
was a leading method of understanding individual differences in general cognition 
(Mayer, 1990). Thorndike (1920), was one of the first researchers to outline that 
social cognition should be measured separately from general cognition. Whilst he 
believed that measures of social cognition could improve the ability to understand 
and manage humans, he reflected that social cognitive tests could only be 
assessed correctly in a natural setting where humans could socially interact with 
one another (Thorndike & Stein, 1937). The George Washington Social Test was 
the first tests to attempt to quantify social intelligence through facets of 
judgement, such as the recognition of mental states and memory of names/faces 
(Moss & Hunt, 1927). It was however found to be unsuccessful in its attempt to 
qualify social intelligence as its own entity due it being highly correlated with 
general intelligence.  
 
Years later, Marlow and colleagues (1986) collated a large battery of personality 
measures in order to examine various aspects of social cognition. Their factor 
analysis revealed five dimensions of social intelligence: social skills; pro-social 
attitude; emotionality; empathy skills and social anxiety. These dimensions were 
found to be independent of measures of general intelligence. Gardener (1996) 
built on these findings by proposing that intelligence should be understood as 
modalities as opposed to a single defining unit. He suggested that interpersonal 
intelligence is a measure of one’s sensitivity to other people’s moods, 
temperament, feelings and motivations as well as their ability to cooperate. 
Likewise, intrapersonal intelligence should be considered as a measure of one’s 
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own ability to identify their strengths and weaknesses, unique qualities and their 
ability to predict their own emotions and reactions.  
 
Social cognitive research later moved into the realm of neuropsychology; 
researchers sought to better understand the underpinnings of social cognition 
through mapping them on to specific brain regions. For example, brain injury 
research provided insight into the role of: the posterior superior temporal sulcus 
region for interpreting action (Saxe, Carey, & Kanwisher, 2004). 
Neuropsychological research also highlighted the role of the temporal-parietal 
junction role in mental state representation (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003); the 
amygdala in emotional recognition (Adolphs, 2001); the ventro-medial prefrontal 
cortices in emotion decision-making (Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, & Aharon-
Peretz, 2003) and the role of the somato-sensory cortexes in social drive and 
anticipatory fear (Sutton et al., 2005). 
 
Interest in how social cognition develops in humans initially focused on the innate 
drive for infants to interact with their caregivers. Piaget (1964) theorised that 
infants gradually build an internal representation of the world as their brain 
modules slowly become active (Rochat, 2009). Research demonstrated that 
neurotypical infants coordinate eye gaze (Castiello, 2003); participate in joint 
attention (Tomasello & Farrar, 1986) and engage in mirrored movements 
(Gallese & Goldman, 1998) with their caregivers. Later research offered a more 
complex understanding of social interaction, through investigating how the infant 
caregiver relationship informs the development of social cognitive networks via 
motor, sensory and perceptual routes (Klin, Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar, 2003; 
McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007; Meltzoff, 2007). This move away from a domain-
specific to a domain-general understanding of social cognition offered a more 
nuanced appreciation of how one’s personality, social environment and culture 
interact with brain networks to develop social interaction abilities. In support of 
this, Meltzoff’s (2007) research demonstrated that infants respond to others using 
a ‘like me framework’. She proposed that through using motor, sensory and 
emotional cues, infants create a mental representation of acts they see others 
perform and liken it to their own experiences. Accordingly, the studies 
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demonstrated that infants develop their understanding of the world through 
interacting relationally (Rochat, 2009; Vygotsky, 1967). 
 
The following section will offer a summary of the four leading psychological 
theories of ASD; Executive Functioning, Weak Central Coherence, Extreme Male 
Brain Theory of Autism and Theory of Mind. 
 
1.2.2.1. Executive Functioning and the Frontal Metaphor 
EF is the term widely used to describe the range of cognitive skills required for 
regulating thoughts and actions (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Barkley, 2012). 
Specifically, it is an umbrella term for functions such as response 
selection/inhibition, planning and working memory (Hill, 2004). The frontal lobe is 
said to primarily be responsible for these ‘higher order’ neurocognitive functions 
(Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Baddely, 1986; Barkley, 2012). However, there is also 
evidence to suggest that EF processes involve interconnectivity between different 
brain regions (Foster, Buck, & Bronskill, 1997). Therefore, whilst the frontal lobes 
remain a significant area of cognitive functioning in tasks that require EF abilities, 
a more nuanced understanding would appreciate how EF tasks require global 
interconnectivity across the brain.  
 
Difficulties with EF have been associated across neurodevelopmental 
presentations from early childhood (Sun & Buys, 2012). A growing body of 
research has demonstrated that compared to matched controls, individuals with 
ASD show difficulties with tasks that involve: mental flexibility (Meltzer, 2014), 
inhibition (Bishop & Norbury, 2005), set-shifting (Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999) and 
self-monitoring (Robinson, Goddard, Dritschel, Wisley, & Howlin, 2009).  
 
The Executive Dysfunction theory of ASD (Hill, 2004; Ozonoff, Pennington, & 
Rogers, 1991; Shallice, 1988) explains that the above-mentioned neurocognitive 
differences account for a range of difficulties in individuals with a diagnosis of 
ASD. For example: the need for consistence; perseverating on tasks; becoming 
pre-occupied with special interests and experiencing challenges with detecting 
subtle social cues to adapt social communication styles (Craig et al., 2016).  
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1.2.2.2. Weak Central Coherence  
The Weak Central Coherence Theory (Happé & Frith, 2006) was developed in 
response to findings that ASD participants perform superiorly in comparison to 
normally developing participants on: embedded figure tasks (Baron‐Cohen, 
Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997) block design tasks (Morgan, Maybery, & 
Durkin, 2003) and rote memory tasks (Frith & Happé, 1994). The theory is said to 
account for the detail-focused attention style of individuals with ASD (Happé & 
Frith, 2006). It also accounts for difficulties experienced by this population in 
integrating social information that is required for social interaction and mentalizing 
(Frith, 1989). The theory of WCC also provides an explanation for the heightened 
sensory differences experienced by individuals with ASD. For example, many 
individuals with ASD report a heighted sensitivity to recognising distinct musical 
tones, or having a talent a painting in photographic detail (Morgan et al., 2003).  
 
1.2.2.3. Extreme Male Brain Theory of Autism 
Baron-Cohen (2010) suggests that the ‘male brain’ is statistically more likely to 
think systemically than the female brain. Therefore, ASD captures the extreme 
end of this spectrum. He argues that this is evidenced within ASD through the 
insistence on sameness, displaying restricted interests and behaviours, as well 
as thinking, communicating and interacting more logically as opposed to 
empathetically (Greenberg, Warrier, Allison, & Baron-Cohen, 2018). Nonetheless, 
this theory has been criticised for perpetuating the idea of a ‘male norm’ of 
behaviour, which has social consequences of perceptions of skills strengths 
across sexes (Ridley, 2019). 
 
1.2.2.4. Theory of Mind   
The Theory of Mind (ToM) Model has dominated the field of research 
investigating how humans interact with one another since the 1970’s (Leudar & 
Costall, 2009a). Premack and Wooduff (1978) were the first to create a set of 
experiments which demonstrated that humans and primates share that capacity 
to acknowledge themselves as unique but distinct from others (Premack, 1976; 
Premack & Woodruff, 1978). It was subsequently proposed that humans apply 
theories of mental states to understand their own actions and make predictions 
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about the behaviour of others. As such, the phrase ‘Theory of Mind’ was 
developed (Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  
 
Early research in this area discovered that children at three years old make 
reference to their own and others intentions when being asked ‘why’ questions 
(Hood, Bloom, & Brainerd, 1979). Three to five year olds have also been found to 
correctly identify the difference between intended and unintended acts (Shultz, 
1980). Later, a more complex ToM task was developed called the false-belief 
task paradigm (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). This test requires an 
individual to hold in mind information that another person is not aware of. 
Performances on this test revealed that that four year olds, but not three year 
olds can understand their own minds to be distinct from that of another (Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988; Perner et al., 1987).  
 
In Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith’s (1985) classic ToM study, it was discovered 
that typically developing (TD) children and intellectually impaired children with 
Down’s Syndrome can pass theory of mind tests, but children of the same age 
with Autism and average intelligence have difficulty. This study launched the ToM 
theory of Autism, which describes that individuals with ASD lack the capacity to 
theorise about the beliefs and desires of themselves and others (Baron-Cohen, 
1997; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). In support of this theory, behavioural studies 
have demonstrated that children with ASD are developmentally delayed in 
acquiring the ability to attribute mental states both to humans (Happé, 1994) and 
ambiguous visual stimuli (Kiln, 2000). The ToM theory of Autism has also been 
supported by numerous accounts of individuals reflecting upon their experience 
of living with a diagnosis of Autism (Grandin, 1995; Losh & Capps, 2006; Ryan & 
Raisanen, 2008). Within these reflections, many have also detailed their 
experience of struggling with the introspective aspects of social interaction (Frith 
& Happé, 1999).   
 
1.2.2.5. Beyond ToM 
The ToM Model of Autism has been criticised for its unquestioned dominance 
across the ASD research field (Reddy & Morris, 2009). For example, it is 
regularly explored in books (Attwood, 2006) and online resources (Baron-Cohen, 
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2008) as being one of the leading theories of Autism, without there being room 
for an exploration of its weaknesses and limitations as a theory.   
 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith (1985) point out that there is a lot of variability of 
children passing theory of mind tests in studies. They also point out that 20% of 
children in the original study ToM study passed the false-belief task and another 
task where mental state attribution was tested via pictures. In the study’s 
defence, Baron-Cohen (1989) explained that those who were successful on the 
first-order theory of mind test were then unable to pass a more complex second-
order theory of mind test, suggesting that an underlying theory of mind deficit still 
existed in the ASD population. Nonetheless, Happé and Frith (1995) claim that 
ToM does not provide enough of an explanation for the previously described 
‘triad of impairments’ known to the disorder.  
 
Gallagher (2004) also proposed that the inter-subjectivity involved in social 
interaction is a lot more complex than simply attributing mental states. For 
example, whilst three year olds can not pass first-order theory of mind tests, they 
are still able to establish a social interaction as they enter the testing room 
through making eye-contact, smiling, gesturing etc. Coster and Lauder (2009b) 
also argue that many groups of individuals are unable to pass theory of mind 
tests, but are undeniably sociable in nature. For example: individuals with severe 
learning disabilities; those who lack capacity and even cats and dogs. As such, 
failing to pass a theory of mind test does not automatically define someone as 
having a diagnosis of Autism. Furthermore, the ToM theory of Autism is limited in 
its ability to provide an explanation for the wider range of verbal and non-verbal 
features that contribute to social interaction.  
 
1.2.3. Beyond a Single Deficit Model of ASD 
Although the single deficit models have given rise to a range of useful 
frameworks for further research, they fail to capture the heterogeneity (Mandy & 
Lai, 2016); co-morbidity (Simonoff et al., 2008); strengths (Baron-Cohen, 2009) 
and the savant skills (Treffert, 2014) observed within the ASD population (Happé, 
Ronald, & Plomin, 2006). An alternative perspective is to see the common 
underlying traits and conceptualizations of ASD as being part of a wider 
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framework that incorporates multiple cognitive domains into one model (Herbert, 
2005). Other researchers have also tried to weave the various theories into one 
thread. For example, by suggesting that the commonalities across the cognitive 
models are unified by an underlying difficulty in cortical information integration, 
which are the result of under-connectively between different brain regions and 
over-connectivity within localized areas the brain regions (Rippon, Brock, Brown, 
& Boucher, 2007).  
 
1.2.4. General Cognition and ASD 
There is some evidence to suggest that individuals with ASD demonstrate 
different performances on tests of general cognition, in comparison to individuals 
without ASD. For example, some studies (Dawson, Soulières, Gernsbacher, & 
Mottron, 2007; Ghaziuddin & Mountain-Kimchi, 2004; Grondhuis & Mulick, 2013) 
have found that individuals with ASD demonstrate superior performances on non-
verbal visual spatial tests, such as WAIS Block Design Tests (Wechsler, 2008) 
and Raven Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 2000).  Dawson, Soulières, 
Gernsbacher, & Mottron (2007) argue that performance of these tests are often 
discussed as being a non-verbal ability weakness, rather than a strength in 
visual-spatial abilities in the ASD population. It is also a common suggestion that 
individuals with ASD show poor fluid intelligence (Blair, 2006; Ozonoff et al., 
1991). However, research has since demonstrated that individuals with ASD 
outperform individuals without ASD on Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices 
Test (Raven et al., 2000).  
 
There has also been a lot of interest in to differences in performances for 
individuals with ASD in comparison to typically developing (TD) individuals on 
tests of Social Cognition. The field of Social Cognition has generated a wide span 
of approaches to researching how and why humans interact with one other, such 
as: understanding beliefs, Mentalizing; coordinating attention; coordinating action; 
facial expressions and eye gaze (Blakemore, J. Winston, & Frith, 2004). One key 
finding that has arisen from this research has been the discovery of the mirror 
neuron system; a neural network that becomes active when experiencing or 
doing something and when we observe others experience or do something 
(Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Research in this area gave rise to the Broken 
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Mirror Neuron Theory of Autism, which proposes that the mirror neuron system is 
less active in individuals with ASD than TD individuals (Dapretto et al., 2006; 
Perkins, Stokes, McGillivray, & Bittar, 2010). Whilst the theory has its limitations 
(Fan, Decety, Yang, Liu, & Cheng, 2010; Southgate & Hamilton, 2008), the 
results suggest that the Mirror Neuron System is a key part of complexity of 
factors the give rise social communication and interaction difficulties in individuals 
with ASD (Hamilton, 2013).   
Social cognitive research has also demonstrated that children with ASD show 
differences in eye-gaze, imitation and joint attention in comparison to TD 
individuals (Park, 1972; J. H. Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, & Perrett, 2001). 
However, research has since suggested that children with Autism do not have an 
absence of these skills, but instead focus on different aspects of their 
environment. For example, when viewing a video of adults in a social scenario, 
children with ASD focus on the mouths of the actors, in comparison to the control 
group who were looking at the eyes (Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 
2002). Studies researching emotional recognition have also found that language 
comprehension that has been learnt through social interaction, was achieved 
over greater periods of time for children with ASD than TD children (Murphy, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2005). In addition to this, some studies have 
shown that children with ASD struggle to recognise their own emotional states in 
comparison to normally developing children (Kuusikko et al., 2008; Meltzoff, 
2007). Whilst these findings provide some explanation for the social differences 
observed in individuals with ASD, these findings are inconsistent with other 
studies showing that children with ASD can describe their emotions in relation to 
friendship satisfaction and can describe feelings of anxiety and distress that lead 
to social withdrawal (Bauminger & Kasari, 2000; Bauminger, Shulman, & Agam, 
2003; White & Roberson-Nay, 2009). Therefore, it could be argued that 
individuals with a diagnosis of ASD do have access to their emotions, but they 
express them differently to those around them. Another explanation is that 
individuals with ASD overcome difficulties with emotional processing through 
drawing upon other cognitive or intellectual methods (Hermelin & O’Connor, 
1985). The authors suggest that that logical-affective state can be slower and 
more error-prone than an auto-affective state adopted by TD individuals.  Whilst 
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the same end goal can be achieved, the theory suggests that the different routes 
result in differences in performance on tests of social cognition(Williams & 
Happé, 2009).  
As explored, there are wide number of approaches to measuring social cognition 
in ASD. However, the ToM model remains the most dominant theory of ASD. 
Over the years this has also led to ToM tests gaining the most empirical support 
of this theory (Baron-Cohen, 2000). Whilst first and second order false belief tests 
gave rise to the ToM theory, research indicates that they are not effective at 
discerning a difference in ToM abilities for those aged over fourteen (Jolliffe & 
Baron-Cohen, 1999; Lombardo et al., 2007; Ozonoff, Pennington, et al., 1991), 
despite evidence of difficulties in social communication and interaction (Tager-
Flusberg, 1999). There are various explanations as to why this is, for example, 
some authors say that ToM tests do not adequately capture difficulties in 
everyday ‘normative’ social interaction because the testing procedures are too 
artificial and focus too specifically on certain aspects of social cognition, such as 
shared expectation (Curry & Jones-Chesters, 2012; Green, Gilchrist, Burton, & 
Cox, 2000). Other explanations suggest that the tests are limited by not 
controlling for differences in language ability between participants (Happé, 1994).  
 
More advanced and naturalistic tests were subsequently developed and fall into 
two over-arching categories: non-literal language tests and emotional recognition 
tests. The non-literal language tests (for example: the Faux-pas test (FPT) 
(Baron-Cohen, O'riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999) and the Strange 
Stories Questionnaire (SSQ) (Happé, 1994)) are advanced ToM tests that were 
developed to measure the detection of non-literal language. For example, the 
SSQ tested the detection of sarcasm, persuasion and white lies and the FPT 
tested for the recognition of someone mistakenly saying something they should 
not have.  On the other hand, emotional recognition tests (for example: Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET: Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & 
Plumb, 2001)) measure the ability of an individual to detect an emotion by looking 
at an image of a person’s face or picture. The following literature review will 
explore the use of advanced ToM tests and other ToM measures to consider 
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whether there is support for the ToM model of Autism in the HF Adult ASD 
population.  
 
1.3. Literature Review 
 
The literature review was not intended to be a full systematic review, however a 
systematic process was used to develop search terms and an exclusion criteria. 
A literature review of ToM tests with the Autism population prior to 2000 has 
already been conducted (For review, see Baron-Cohen, 2000). Accordingly, the 
current literature review spans from 2000-2020 so as not to replicate these 
findings. The following section will also focus specifically on research using tests 
of ToM with Adult HF ASD participants and matched controls to explore whether 
there is support for the ToM model in the adult HF ASD population.  
 
1.3.1. Data Sources 
The initial searches were carried out using the EBSCO electronic databases to 
identify relevant research published between 2000 and March 2020. Further 
searches were then carried out using narrative and snowballing techniques via 
Google scholar.  A diagram illustrating the selection process can be seen in 
Figure 1.  The following search terms were used to conduct the searches: 
“Asperger’s Syndrome”, “Autism”, “Autism Spectrum Disorder”, “Theory of mind”, 
“ToM”, “social understanding”, “social cognition”, “false belief”, “perspective 
taking”, “mindreading”, “mentalizing”, “Test”, “measure”, “assessment”, “adult” 
“18+”. Studies selected were written in English and were published in peer-
reviewed journals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
Figure 1.  
PRISMA (Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, Altman, & Group., 2009) Adapted Flow  
Diagram of Article Selection Process 
 
 
1.3.1.1. Advanced ToM tests 
A number of studies have found that HF Autistic adults perform more poorly than 
matched normally developing controls on the SSQ, FP and RMET (Pedreno, 
Pousa, Navarro, Pamias, & Obiols, 2017; Scheeren, De Rosnay, Koot, & Begeer, 
2013; Zalla, Sav, Stopin, Ahade, & Leboyer, 2009). However, the results of these 
tests were limited by: small sample size; a wide age-span and a lack of female 
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participants. There is also evidence to suggest that some advanced tests of ToM 
are more effective at supporting the ToM model in the HF adult ASD population 
than others. For example, a number of studies have found that adult HF ASD 
participants have poorer performances than normally developing matched 
controls on the FPT and the SSQ test, but not on the RMET (Oakley, Brewer, 
Bird, & Catmur, 2016; Söderstrand & Almkvist, 2012; Spek, Scholte, & Van 
Berckelaer-Onnes, 2010).  
 
1.3.1.2. Implicit ToM 
More recently, it has been theorised that ToM has separate implicit (unconscious 
and spontaneous) and explicit (conscious and deliberate attention) components 
(Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007). Tests of ToM have been developed in order 
to assess whether differences in implicit and explicit ToM can be observed in the 
adult ASD population in comparison to matched, TD controls. To assess implicit 
ToM, an eye-tracking devise is typically used to measure anticipatory looking on 
a false-belief task. Explicit ToM is then typically measured by assessing 
participant performance on classic ToM tests (Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 
2009). A number of studies have adopted this paradigm and supported the 
finding that there is a specific deficit in implicit ToM, but not explicit ToM in adults 
with HF ASD (Doi, Kanai, Tsumura, Shinohara, & Kato, 2020; Schneider, 
Slaughter, Bayliss, & Dux, 2013; Schuwerk, Vuori, & Sodian, 2015; Senju et al., 
2009; Sommer et al., 2018; Torralva et al., 2013). A further study also used a 
novel computerized version of an implicit ToM task (Deschrijver, Bardi, 
Wiersema, & Brass, 2016). Whilst no group differences were found, errors made 
on the task were positively correlated with self-reported autistic traits and 
observed autistic behaviors. 
Schuwerk et al. (2015) later adapted the implicit ToM task paradigm (Senju et al., 
2009) to include a learning element. The results of this study revealed that a 
difference was found between the adult HF Autism group (N=18) and the 
matched TD controls (N=19) on the original implicit ToM false belief task. 
However, no difference was found between the two groups when the learning 
component was added to the task. The results therefore suggested that HF adult 
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Autistic participants could modify their performance on the implicit ToM tasks, 
based upon experience.   
 
One study used a naturalistic video task to observe the implicit and explicit ToM 
processes between HF adults ASD (N=28) participants and the TD control 
participants (N=23). In support of the ToM model of ASD, the results revealed 
that the HF adult ASD participants performed more poorly in the naturalistic ToM 
video tasks than the control group. However, in contrast to previous findings the 
results revealed that both implicit and explicit ToM processes were similarly 
impaired in the adult HF ASD group, despite there being a distinction between 
the two ToM processes in the control group. One study also found much subtler 
differences in Implicit ToM in ASD participants (N=17) in comparison to the TD 
controls (N=17), suggesting that TD adults also demonstrate difficulty with implicit 
ToM (Cole, Slocombe, & Barraclough, 2018).  
 
1.3.1.3. Naturalistic  
There are number of studies that have drawn upon the ToM model to develop 
ToM tests that are more naturalistic. For example, one study introduced an 
naturalistic open-ended narrative task to measure the number of mental state 
words used by adult HF ASD participants (N=20) in comparison to TD matched 
controls (N=20) (Beaumont & Newcombe, 2006). The findings revealed that the 
HF Autistic group used significantly fewer mental state words on the open-ended 
narrative task than the control group. It was also recorded that the ASD group 
gave fewer explanations for character’s mental states. Other studies showed 
evidence in support of a ToM deficit in Adults with HF ASD when a vocalization 
component was added to the ToM tasks (Kleinman, Marciano, & Ault, 2001; 
Rutherford, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2002).  
 
A number of studies have used video clips to assess emotional recognition and 
mental state identification. The results of these studies reveal that adults with HF 
perform poorer in these tests that matched TD controls (Dziobek et al., 2006; 
Golan, Simon Baron-Cohen, Hill, & Golan, 2006; Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen, 
& Rutter, 2000; Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van der Heyden, 2004). 
One study used video clips of Happé’s (1999) Strange Stories items to increase 
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the real-word applicability of the ToM test (Brewer, Young, & Barnett, 2017). The 
results indicated that there was a group difference found between the ASD 
(N=163) and the TD controls (N=80) on the social sub-test, but not on the 
physical subtest after controlling for verbal IQ. Interestingly, a lot of inter-group 
variation was also observed within the ASD group with some demonstrating little 
difficulty and others demonstrating significant impairment.  
 
One naturalistic study found no support for a deficit in ToM in HF ASD 
participants (N=34) in comparison to matched normally developing controls 
(N=34). The study used the Communication Game (Epley, Morewedge, & 
Keysar, 2004) to measure the participants ability to consider another person’s 
knowledge when interpreting what he/she said, in order to move objects across a 
board (Begeer, Malle, Nieuwland, & Keysar, 2010). Previous studies also 
demonstrated that the Communication Game was sensitive to variations in mood 
(Converse, Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2008) and culture (Wu & Keysar, 2007).  
 
1.3.2. Summary and Gaps in the Literature 
In the studies that used the classic advanced ToM tests (SSQ, FPT and RMET), 
there were mixed findings and numerous study limitations. For example, the lack 
of female participants in the studies failed to take into account the different 
presentations of ASD across sexes (Kreiser & White, 2014). Another limitation is 
the wide span of ages used in some the studies. For example, one study included 
participants between the ages of twelve and forty-two (Pedreno et al., 2017). This 
in turn limited the internal validity of the study by failing to account for the 
developmental differences with and across the groups (Blakemore, Winston, & 
Frith, 2004). Other limitations included evidence of IQ correlating with 
performance on the RMET (Baker, Peterson, Pulos, & Kirkland, 2014). Whilst 
there was some evidence of cultural diversity across the studies (Söderstrand & 
Almkvist, 2012), as discussed earlier, drawing conclusions from cross-cultural 
studies needs to be approached with caution (Dyches, Wilder, Sudweeks, 
Obiakor, & Algozzine, 2004). Accordingly, whilst there was some support for the 
ToM model within the Adult ASD population, there was need for the research to 
be replicated with larger, more representative sample.  
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The naturalistic studies also showed support for the ToM model of ASD. The 
tests also offered reliable and ecologically valid methods of discerning within 
group differences in ToM accuracy, whilst also controlling for IQ and verbal 
ability. However, the adoption of the mood and culture sensitive; Communication 
Game paradigm (Begeer et al., 2010), found there to be no difference between 
the ASD participants and the matched controls. Accordingly, the voice, video, and 
open-ended narrative naturalistic tests may be limited by a lack of sensitivity to 
variations in mood in culture. A further limitation may be the applicability of these 
tests for use in a clinical setting. Most of the studies described lengthy testing 
procedures and the requirement of technology to play a video (Livingston, Carr, & 
Shah, 2019). Accordingly, future studies may benefit from adapting the 
naturalistic ToM studies to be quicker and more accessible for use in a clinical 
setting.  
 
The implicit ToM tests offered insight into difficulties with spontaneous ToM in 
adults with HF ASD. One study also highlighted that including a learning 
component can improve the implicit ToM performance in the HF adult ASD group 
(Schuwerk et al., 2015). This provides some explanation for why individuals with 
ASD appear to pass first and second order ToM tasks beyond a certain age 
(Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Lombardo et al., 2007; Ozonoff, Pennington, et al., 
1991). It also provides some explanation for the social cognitive processes 
behind social camouflaging (Dean et al., 2017). However, the findings of other 
studies suggested that improving the real-life applicability of the ToM test may 
increase the likelihood of explicit ToM errors being made (Rosenblau, Kliemann, 
Heekeren, & Dziobek, 2015). The research described may also be subject to 
limitations and surrounding debate regarding the existence and measurability of 
implicit ToM (Livingston et al., 2019). For example, the accuracy of using eye-
tracking device as a indicator of implicit ToM (Heyes, 2014).  
 
1.3.3. The Current Study 
The current study aims to build upon the research discussed above by 
developing an ecologically valid and engaging measure of ToM that also explores 
the implicit components of ToM. To date, not many studies have used a game-
like procedure to test the ToM model in adults with HF ASD (Livingston et al., 
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2019). Games have been described as a form of play that involve elements of 
activity, self-motivation, make-believe processes and rewarded action (Rieber, 
1996). When applied to a measure of social cognition, a game-like process can 
replicate elements of interpersonal coordination such as: turn taking, decision 
making, goal setting and rule breaking (Higgins, McCann, & Fondacaro, 1982; 
Mehta, Starmer, & Sugden, 1994a, 1994b). The ambition of the current study is 
to apply a game-like design to increase the engagement and level of social 
interaction when assessing social cognition (ToM) in the adult ASD population. It 
aims to support the adult HF ASD population through being a more enjoyable 
assessment experience. Furthermore, the interactive features of the standardized 
measure aims to connect more closely with everyday difficulties in social 
interaction and communication faced by this population. The study will also 
explore the implicit and explicit aspects of the ToM model by qualitatively 
exploring the reasoning behind the ToM decisions made within the game. It is 
hoped that this approach to the assessment of social cognition (ToM) will offer 
intervention level benefits through the immediate social feedback offered via the 
game-like approach. The following chapter will discuss the new measure’s 
design, development, and review processes.  
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CHAPTER 2: METHOD 1 
 
 
2.1 Philosophy of Science 
 
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature, origin and 
limits of human knowledge (Ferrier, 1854). There are multiple epistemological 
positions (Willig, 2013), each with their own assumptions regarding how 
knowledge is derived and the interaction between concepts such as subjectivity, 
truth and fact (Lloyd, 2014). It is important for researchers to be aware of and 
explicit about the philosophical position of the research, because these 
assumptions underpin and guide the methodological design and data analyses 
(Barker, Pistrang, & Elliott, 2015). Although a full account of the debates and 
development in epistemology is beyond the scope of the thesis, an exploration of 
the philosophical position taken by the researcher is provided below. 
 
The scientific method is grounded within the realist epistemological position. It 
follows the notion that reality exists and is independent of our representations of it 
(Grayling, 1992). Positivism is often associated with this position and is based on 
the view that whatever exists can be verified through logical proof, experiments 
and observation (Martin, 1981). Popper (1963) was a prominent advocate of the 
scientific method, but criticised the positivist empirical approach of using simple 
observations to form the basis of knowledge (Caldwell, 2015). As such, he 
argued that scientific research should rely on deduction and falsification. 
Hypotheses should therefore be derived from theory and tested through 
experimental or observational research in order to falsify a theory’s claims 
(Caldwell, 2015). Whilst the positivist approach to the scientific method remains 
influential, it has been criticised for its failure to address issues of power, which 
privileges certain types of knowledge over others (Pilgrim, 2013).   
 
Social constructionism is another epistemological position (Burr, 1998). It follows 
the assumption that society is actively produced by human beings and therefore 
the portrayal of the world is socially produced rather than pre-existing (Thomas, 
1966). It is argued that language makes it possible to develop thoughts and 
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concepts, which in turn generates a structure for how the world is experienced 
(Burr, 1998). Social constructionism is criticised for being open to extreme 
relativism through placing too much emphasis on language (McLaughlin & 
Boghossian, 2008). For example, it can undermine the role of innate biological 
tendencies (Pinker, 2016). 
 
Disability research has typically been categorized into either realist or social 
constructionist positions (Bhaskar & Danermark, 2006). Research lying within a 
realist epistemological position has sought to discover the ‘truth’ behind the origin 
of a disability; for example, research investigating the genetic profile of those with 
ASD. On the other hand, research lying within a social constructionist position 
has helped to illustrate how social and cultural confines of language use has 
shaped and limited our perception of disability (Burr, 2003).  
 
The current research sits in between the realist and social constructionist 
positions through taking a Critical Realist epistemological position (Willig, 2013). 
This stance assumes that a ‘real’ world and knowledge exists and can be 
objectively measured, but the source of measurement is limited by human bias 
and subjectivity (Lopez & Potter, 2005). Accordingly, whilst the current study 
makes inferences about ToM based upon observed verbal and behavioural 
responses; it also acknowledges that ToM is a construct that is developed by 
subjective interpretations, thus, cannot be directly observed.  
 
2.2. Overview 
 
As discussed in the introduction, the current study aims to develop an 
ecologically valid and engaging game-like measure of ToM that is suitable for the 
HF ASD population; The Friendship Game (TFG). The current study has been 
split into two stages: the first stage documents the development and initial testing 
of the TFG; the second stage investigates the performance of the participants on 
TFG. The aims and objectives of the current study are as follows: 
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2.2.1. Aims 
1.  
a. Develop a new measure of social cognition for use with adults with 
ASD that is based upon the ToM construct.  
b. For the measure to demonstrate increased ecological validity in 
comparison to previous measures of social cognition. 
2. To consider how the results relate to current measures of social cognition 
3.  To use the knowledge gained from the research to make 
recommendations for intervention.  
 
2.2.2. Objectives 
1. To investigate performance on the new test in adult participants with HF 
ASD. 
2. To explore that any deficits on the new test were not due to weaknesses in 
other areas of cognitive function. 
3. To interview participants to obtain feedback regarding: 
a. Their experience of playing TFG  
b. How TFG compared to other measures of social cognition 
c. How TFG compares to everyday experiences of challenges with 
social cognition 
d. Ideas for how TFG could be improved and/or adapted for 
intervention support with everyday challenges with ToM 
 
2.3 Test Development 
 
The aim of the current study was to develop a new measure of social cognition 
that is both engaging and takes account of social learning capacities within the 
Adult ASD population. The following section will describe the stages of TFG 
development.  Due TFG being in the pilot stages of development and due to the 
time limits of completing a thesis, it was not anticipated that a large participant 
number would be achieved. Instead, TFG development will adopt an exploratory 
method to testing the validity and reliability of TFG. It is hoped that the pilot 
testing of TFG will inform future objectives and formal validation of the TFG.  To 
do this, TFG will follow the following stages of instrument development.  
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Stages of instrument development (Prince, Stewart, Ford, & Hotopf, 2003)  
1. Definition of construct  
2. Review of construct definition  
3. Item drafting 
4. Item review  
5. Alpha testing  
6. Beta testing  
7. Post-development testing 
 
2.4 Item Drafting  
 
2.4.1 Concept Development 
When casting around for ideas for a new and engaging measure of social 
cognition, a board game called ‘Fog of Love’ (FoL) (Hush Hush Projects, 2018) 
was discovered. The aim of FoL is to create a hypothetical romantic relationship 
between two characters. Each player builds a character by selecting their 
personality and identity (name, interests and career); they then answer a series 
of questions both individually and collectively to assess their characters 
compatibility for one another. The players gain points for answering questions 
that are in line with their characters’ individual and shared personality traits. At 
the end of the game, the players decide whether their characters are romantically 
compatible for one another. 
 
It was identified that FoL drew upon the ToM paradigm in order for the characters 
to build romantic compatibility to one another. As such, the players needed to 
theorise about their own characters’ mind and the other characters’ in order to 
select answers that were in line with both their individual and collective 
personalities traits. Accordingly, FoL was identified as a novel and engaging 
format by which the new measure of Social Cognition could be based upon. 
Similarly, it was decided that ToM would be the primary construct that would be 
measured within the new measure social cognition, TFG. In order to convert FoL 
into a standardised and engaging measure of ToM, appropriate for use with an 
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adult HF ASD population, a series of adaptations were made. The following 
section describes the steps taken to convert FoL into TFG.  
 
2.4.2. Building a Friendship 
Firstly, it was considered more appropriate and ethical for a new measure of 
social cognition to be based upon building friendships, rather than a romantic 
relationship. Accordingly, this was the first change that was made. The stages of 
building a friendship then needed to be standardised. To do this, a series of 
social scenarios and four responses were created to produce the initial ToM 
content. The social scenarios were organised into the ‘Chapters’ of making a new 
friendship. It was proposed that the application of ToM to develop a new 
friendship could be conceptualised in the following way: 
• Chapter 1: Getting to know each other’s personality and sharing 
information about oneself to help the other person understand your own 
personality.  
• Chapter 2: Making inferences about the other person’s actions according 
to the beliefs and desires that align with their personality. Also, making 
decisions based upon one’s own personality that will help the other person 
understand your beliefs and desires and make inferences about your likely 
actions.   
• Chapter 3: Using knowledge about one’s own and another person’s beliefs 
and desires to help compromise on a course of action when agreeing 
about a decision, that will make both parties’ happy.  
 
2.4.3. Characters 
Another element that needed to be adapted was the standardisation of the 
characters. This aspect of the game went through several reviews because of the 
emphasis on the game to incorporate an element of real-life applicability. As 
described above, in the “Fog of Love” game, the two players design their own 
character, however, it was decided that this would made it difficult for the 
conditions to establish internal and external reliability. Instead, the researcher 
would play the character of ‘Ashley’ in order to standardise the conditions and 
make it clear that the participant was not building a real-life relationship with the 
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researcher. The name ‘Ashley’ was chosen as a gender-neutral name to reduce 
the confounding influence of the researcher playing a character of the 
opposite/same gender to the participant.  
 
2.4.4. Personality 
To build a character, the participant was asked to select three personality traits 
that reflect their own personality. Similar to FoL, the personality traits were 
adapted from research on the HEXACO model of personality structure (Ashton & 
Lee, 2007). The HEXACO model was originally designed as a method of 
measuring human behaviour, thought and emotion (Matthews, Deary, & 
Whiteman, 2003). Their research proposed that there are six personality 
dimensions: Honesty-Humility (H), Emotionality (E), Extroversion (X), 
Agreeableness (A), Conscientiousness (C) and Openness to Experience. Each of 
these factors consists of a high and low dimension of the trait. It was considered 
that the participant might perceive being ‘low’ on the trait dimension negatively, 
accordingly, the ‘high and ‘low’ dimensions of the HEXACO model traits were 
adapted to so that the participant could have twelve trait options to choose from. 
Each trait included three synonyms to help explain the meaning of the trait. Listed 
below is the final adaption of the HEXACO model for TFG: 
 
• Honesty-Humility  
o (High) Sincere: Someone sincere may be honest, modest and/or 
fair. 
o (Low) Sceptical: Someone sceptical may be cautious, inquisitive 
and/or cynical 
 
• Emotionality 
o (High) Sensitive: Someone sensitive may be compassionate, 
understanding and/or sympathetic. 
o (Low) Strict: Someone strict may be hard, ruthless and/or 
unforgiving. 
 
• Extroversion 
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o (High) Extroverted: Someone extroverted may be outgoing, 
sociable and/or assertive. 
o (Low) Introverted: Someone introverted may be private, quiet and/or 
reserved 
 
• Agreeableness 
o (High) Gentle: Someone gentle may be calm, cooperative and/or 
forgiving 
o (Low) Autonomous: Someone autonomous may be resilient, 
independent and/or self-assured 
 
• Conscientiousness 
o (High) Disciplined: Someone disciplined may be organised, diligent 
and/or hard-working 
o (Low) Relaxed: Someone carefree may be light-hearted, scatty 
and/or easy-going 
 
• Openess to Experience 
o (High) Curious: Someone curious may be innovative, creative 
and/or unconventional 
o (Low) Pragmatic:  Someone pragmatic may be careful, measured 
and/or restrained 
 
In order to standardise the selection of personality traits, the participant was 
asked to select one trait from four ‘Set A’ options, one trait from four ‘Set B’ 
options and one trait from four ‘Set C’ options. Each set included two of the 
HEXACO trait dimensions, therefore four personality traits in total. An example of 
how this was displayed for the participant can be found in Appendix 3.   
 
The following approach was taken to standardise the conditions by which 
‘Ashley’s’ personality traits were selected. 
• For trait A, ‘Ashley’ had the same personality trait as the participant, to 
ensure they had commonalities.  
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• For trait B, ‘Ashley’ selected the alternative HEXACO trait, but at the same 
high/low end of the dimension as the participant. This was a way of 
introducing trait differences between the participant and Ashley.  
• For trait C, Ashley selected the same HEXACO trait, but at the opposite 
end of the dimension. This was designed to make it more difficult for the 
participant to reach a compromise with ‘Ashley’. 
 
2.4.5. Social Engagement  
In each chapter, the researcher read a series of social scenarios to the 
participant. The participant and ‘Ashley’ then selected an answer (A,B,C or D) 
that were in line with their own and Ashley’s personality traits. After allowing time 
to read through the answers, both the participant and ‘Ashley’ revealed their 
selected answer at the same time using a counter with ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ or ‘D’ written on 
it (Appendix 4). The counters were designed to mimic the social interaction 
created between two players in FoL and thus increase the ecological validity of 
TFG. The counters also provided a tangible motivation for selecting the correct 
answer, which helped to scaffold the social learning element within TFG. 
 
In FoL, the characters also gained tokens for selecting answers that were in line 
with their own and their collective personality traits. The use of tokens was initially 
considered as an engaging method of motivating the participants to build a 
friendship within TFG. However, it also presented an ethical dilemma of the 
participants feeling disheartened if they were unable to gain points. Whilst the 
participants still scored points using a similar method, the use of tokens was 
removed.  
 
2.5. Alpha Testing 
 
The alpha testing of the TFG used a co-production approach (Gibbons et al., 
1994), whereby key stakeholders: ASD experts by experience and by profession 
collaborated to inform the development and evaluation of TFG.  
 
2.5.1 Presentation 
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An initial draft of TFG was presented via PowerPoint to a group of Clinical 
Psychologists, Trainee Clinical Psychologists and Assistant Psychologists who 
work in an NHS Autism Diagnostic Service. A copy of the presentation can be 
located in Appendix 9. A demonstration of TFG was conducted with a Trainee 
Clinical Psychologist, there was then an opportunity for the team to provide 
feedback. 
 
Overall, TFG was well received from the professionals who attended the 
workshop. The feedback suggested the TFG was considered socially engaging 
and non-stigmatising through the use of the game-like features. The attendees 
also agreed that the responses required the participant to apply ToM skills in 
order to think about their own beliefs and desires as well as ‘Ashley’s’ in order to 
decide upon an answer response. As such, an initial assessment of content 
validity and face validity of TFG was achieved.  
 
2.5.2. Pilot Studies 
During this stage, the items were also assessed for face validity and test-re-test 
reliability. This process assessed TFG for ceiling, floor effects and internal 
consistency. Due to TFG being completed within the time constraints of a thesis, 
only 10 people were used in the alpha testing stage, rather than the 50-100 that 
is typically recommended (Prince et al., 2003). Included in the alpha testing 
process were professionals in the field of: Clinical Psychology, Nursing, Social 
Work, individuals with knowledge of ASD that the researcher knew professionally 
and personally and an adult with a diagnosis of HF ASD. Unreliable items, such 
as those considered too easy (ceiling effects) or questions consistently answered 
incorrectly (floor effects) were removed. Collectively, their feedback helped to 
shape the answer responses to the social scenarios in Chapters One, Two and 
Three. For example, an answer in line with the ‘Curious’ answer response in 
Chapter Two was consistently mistaken for the ‘Sensitive’ answer response. The 
wording was subsequently adapted to account for this floor effect.  
 
Feedback from this round suggested that it was too time-consuming and 
confusing for the participant to read the social scenarios and answer response 
options out loud. Accordingly, to increase the internal consistency of the 
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measure, it was decided that the researcher would read all the scenarios to the 
participant; the participant would then silently read the answer responses before 
selecting their answer via the counter.   
 
2.6. Final Draft: Game Play and Scoring 
 
All of the social scenarios and answers responses described within this section 
have been significantly adapted from FoL and/or newly developed for TFG. This 
includes the method taken to increase the difficultly of the questions as the 
chapters progress. The standardisation of the scoring system was also newly 
developed for TFG by the researcher. The final draft of the manual and record 
form that was used in the validation study can be found in Appendices 1 and 2 
respectively. 
 
2.6.1. Chapter One: Learning 
The aim of Chapter One was to create some training scenarios where the 
participants could share knowledge about their own personality and learn about 
‘Ashley’s’ personality.  The participant was presented with three scenarios 
(Appendix 5), the first and third scenario asked the participant what ‘Ashley’ 
would do based upon their Set A and Set C personality traits respectively. The 
second scenario asked the participant what they would do in a scenario based 
upon their set B personality trait. Each scenario has four trait prompts (seen 
within the sample below in bold) to help the participant familiarise themself with 
how to select an answer.  
 
2.6.1.1. Sample:  
Present Card 1 and SAY:   “Here is the first situation.  This is about what Ashley 
would do, based on their personality.  You say to Ashley: ‘Ashley, it must be your 
birthday soon, how are you planning to celebrate it?’ 
 
Now, look at these options [point to response options and allow examinee a few 
moments to read].  So, based on Ashley’s Set A personality traits [point to 
personality cards set out in front of examiner], which one of these answers A, B, 
C, or D do you think Ashley would give?” 
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a) Sceptical - I doubt anyone will want to do anything, it is just a birthday 
b) Disciplined I need to save money to go on a holiday, so I will have nice a 
dinner at home. 
c) Sincere – I will host a small gathering and tell people in advanced so they 
can make arrangements if they would like.  
d) Relaxed – I do not mind, I’ll sort it out nearer the time  
 
2.6.2. Chapter Two 
The aim of Chapter Two was to assess the participant’s ability to choose answer 
responses in line with their own personality traits and to identify responses that 
were in line with ‘Ashley’s’ personality traits.  In Chapter Two, the participant did 
not have the personality trait prompts to support their answers (Appendix 6). In 
the example below, the trait prompts in brackets were not visible to the 
participant). Similar to Chapter One, each of the six questions alternated between 
theorising about ‘Ashley’s’ intentions and the participant’s, based upon their 
selected personality trait. The order was as follows:  
• Question 4, what the participant would do based upon their set A 
personality trait. 
• Question 5, what ‘Ashley’ would do based upon their set B personality 
trait. 
• Question 6, what the participant would do based upon their set C 
personality trait. 
• Question 7, what ‘Ashley’ would do based upon their set A personality 
trait. 
• Question 8, what the participant would do based upon their set B 
personality trait. 
• Question 9, what ‘Ashley would do based upon their set C personality trait. 
 
2.6.2.1. Sample: 
Present Card 4 and SAY:  “Here is the first situation.  This one is about what you 
would do.  Ashley says to you: ‘I need to go to a bank meeting to organise my 
finances, how prepared do you think should I be?’ 
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Look at these options [point to response options and allow examinee a few 
moments to read] and tell me, based on your Set A personality trait [point to 
personality cards], which of these answers should you give?” 
 
a) (Disciplined) - Lets plan a time to meet and organise what forms to bring 
b) (Relaxed) – Take it easy! Just show up, I’m sure it’ll be fine 
c) (Sceptical) - I wouldn’t trust banks if I were you! 
d) (Sincere) - To be honest, I think you should contact the bank or look at 
their website to see what they recommend! 
 
SAY: “Why did you think answer X was in line with your set A personality trait?” 
 
2.6.3. Chapter Three 
The aim of Chapter Three was to see whether the participants could consider 
both their own and Ashley’s personality traits in order to make a compromise on 
an answer response to a social scenario.  Chapter Three involved six scenarios 
where the participants were required to consider both their own personality trait 
and ‘Ashley’s’ in order to make a decision that would suit them both. Due to the 
change in format, the first three questions included trait prompts to act as training 
rounds (Appendix 7). The questions included combinations of two traits to reflect 
the need to consider both their own mind and another’s. It was designed and 
scored using the following format: 
• Question 10 & 13, Set A and Set B traits were matched by having the 
same dimension. The best compromise was achieved from choosing the 
option that contained the shared Set A trait.  
• Question 11 & 14, Set A and Set C traits were matched by having the 
same dimension. In order to provide more complexity, two correct options 
would reach a compromise on a decision with Ashley. One answer 
included the shared Set A trait, another answer included a combination of 
participant’s and ‘Ashley’s’ Set C traits. To standardise the procedure, 
‘Ashley’ always chose the Set C response. However, the participant 
received a point for either option.  
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• Question 12 & 15, Set B and Set C traits were matched by having the 
opposite dimension. This meant that the participants had to reach a 
compromise on something, despite the personality traits being the 
opposite end of the spectrum to one another. The participants again had 
two correct options that would offer them a compromise on a decision with 
Ashley. One answer included a combination of participant’s and ‘Ashley’s’ 
Set B traits, another answer included a combination of participant’s and 
‘Ashley’s’ set C traits. To standardise the procedure, ‘Ashley’ always 
chose the Set C response. However, the participant received a point for 
either option. 
 
2.6.3.1. Sample:  
Present Card 10 and SAY: “Ashley says to you: ‘It looks like someone has 
dropped a wallet on the floor, what should we do about it?’ 
 
Look at these options [point to response options and allow examinee a few 
moments to read] and tell me, based upon yours and Ashley’s A and B 
personality traits, which of these answers would both make you happy? 
 
When you have made your decision, please place counter A, B, C or D on the 
table face down” 
 
A Sincere and Disciplined:  We need do the honest thing and hand it in 
immediately to the police, let me organise a route that we can take. 
B Sceptical and Relaxed:  If they were clumsy enough to drop it, I doubt they 
will go to the effort of contacting the police.  If they come back to look, they will 
find it. 
C Sensitive and Pragmatic:  Oh no, how horrible! They must be so worried!  
Let’s leave a note here to say that we have taken it to the nearest police 
station. 
D Strict and Curious:  How careless! What sort of person just drops a wallet? 
Let’s check to see if there are any contact details inside. 
 
SAY: “Why did you think answer X would make you and Ashley happy?” 
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2.7. Beta Testing 
At this stage, the surviving items would normally be tested for validity via a 
separate sample that would be large enough to perform a factor analysis (Prince 
et al., 2003). Due to TFG being completed within the time restraints of a thesis, it 
was not anticipated that the current study would reach a large enough sample to 
complete formal beta testing. However, a pilot version of this stage, using an 
exploratory methodology was attempted instead. This will be described in detail 
in the following chapter. Typically, a formal assessment of convergent validity 
would be achieved via TFG statistically demonstrating a positive relationship to a 
measure that assesses the same ToM construct. The comparison test should be 
an existing ‘Gold Standard’ of ToM that also touches up the social cognition 
construct (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Prince et al., 2003). However, due to the 
current study being built on the premise that there is no ‘gold standard’ measure 
of ToM, this would have not been possible. The other limitation in assessing 
validity is due to sample size being rendered too small to perform statistical 
analyses. In the absence of a ‘gold standard’ measure and due to the small 
sample size, each participant’s performance was treated as a separate ‘case’ 
study. to establish the following areas: 
 
1)  
a) To assess whether the ASD sample were close to or different from the UK 
norms on the Cognitive Tests 
b) To assess whether the ASD sample were impaired on the tests and to 
observe whether this impacted their performance of TFG. 
c) To consider whether the scores on the mood measures affected the 
participant’s performance on the Cognitive tests. 
2) To compare the participant’s performance on TFG with existing measures of 
ToM such as ‘Social Stories’ (Happé, 1994) and the ‘Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).   
3) To assess the construct validity of TFG through qualitatively reviewing the 
extent to which the chapters of TFG meaningfully measure all aspects of the 
ToM construct (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955).  
4) To assess face validity through qualitatively reviewing the extent to which the 
new measure appears to measure the ToM construct (Prince et al., 2003) 
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CHAPTER 3. METHOD 2 
 
 
3.1. Study Design 
 
The current study used an exploratory research design to investigate 
performance on the new instrument, TFG, and to investigate relationships 
between the participants test performances. A Content Analysis Approach was 
used to further assess the face validity of TFG and to derive a scoring system.  In 
addition to this, a Thematic Analysis approach was also used to analyse 
participant feedback in response to playing TFG. The results will inform future the 
objectives and the design of studies investigating TFG as a new measure of 
social cognition.  
 
3.2. Ethical Issues 
 
3.2.1. Ethical Approval 
The study was approved by the University of East London Ethics Committee 
(Appendix 10). 
 
3.2.2. Mental Capacity and Consent 
Participants were identified via a diagnosis of HF ASD; there was therefore no 
anticipation that the participants would lack the capacity to give informed consent 
to participate. These labels indicate that they would have full capacity to consent. 
Participants were be allowed at least 48 hours from the point of receiving the 
information sheet (Appendix 11) to fully consider and reflect upon the potential 
risks and benefits of the research, ask questions and make a decision about 
whether or not to participate, before they were contacted by the researcher. 
Participants were encouraged to contact the researcher with any queries they 
might have before or after agreeing to participate in the study. Participants who 
did not adequately understand written information or verbal explanation given in 
English were to be excluded from the study. Whilst the researcher recognised the 
ethical implications of excluding these potential participants, the tests in question 
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were designed for those with good English fluency and comprehension. 
Furthermore, the study lacked the resources to employ interpreters for individual 
participants. On the day of testing the participants were given the opportunity to 
read through the information sheet again. If they were happy to participate, they 
were asked to sign a consent sheet (Appendix 12). 
 
3.2.3. Confidentiality and Data Protection 
Participants were allocated a number (e.g. 01,02 etc.) so that their data would be 
unidentifiable and stored separately from their identifiable information. 
Demographic Questions, social cognitive measures, Cognitive tests and 
feedback forms were stored in a padlocked folder (only accessible to the 
researcher and supervisors) for transporting from the testing venue back to the 
University of East London. Once at the researcher’s home, they were stored in a 
padlocked filing cabinet that was only accessible to the researcher. The 
confidential information was kept as a hard copy to prevent accidently electronic 
transfer. The anomyonous data was scored and entered onto an Excel and SPSS 
database on the researcher’s secure personal laptop and were password 
protected. The data was also uploaded onto the secure UEL Outlook OneDrive 
that can only be accessed by the researcher and the academic supervisor. Hard 
copies of the data will be destroyed once they are no longer required which is 
expected to be within two years from the end of the study.  This is in keeping with 
the university research data archiving policy, which allows up five years data 
storage. 
 
3.2.4. Participant Burden and Emotional Wellbeing 
Participants deemed ineligible to participate may have felt upset and/or 
experienced a sense of injustice. The study maintained broad inclusion criteria, 
for example a large age range. However, participants deemed ineligible for the 
research when advertising the study would have been provided with a full 
explanation of the reasons for their ineligibility and with the opportunity to ask 
questions regarding this decision. In the end, this step was not required.  
 
It was considered that the cognitive test questions and social cognition questions 
may have been perceived as intrusive or upsetting to the participants. However, a 
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considerate amount of research suggests that tests of social skills and cognitive 
function are not received as distressing to a vast majority of participants doing 
tests of this nature (Bennett-Levy, Klein-Boonschate, Batchelor, McCarter, & 
Walton, 1994).  Nonetheless, a level of anxiety is common when completing tests 
of this nature due to a desire to do well (Bennett-Levy et al., 1994). Due to the 
tests being completed on a voluntary basis and not for diagnostic purposes, the 
anxiety was anticipated to be less. However, a poorer performance than 
anticipated may impact upon their self-esteem. Participants were informed that 
tests might be potentially distressing before consenting to take part in the 
research. They were also debriefed after participating and given the opportunity 
to receive a sensitively worded summary of how performed.  
 
Participants were advised on the participation information sheet that they could 
contact the researcher if they wish to receive this information. They were 
informed that the tests do not constitute as being the results of a clinical cognitive 
test, because they were not conducted as part of a full set of measures alongside 
a cognitive assessment interview. Accordingly, the participants understood that 
the results had no diagnostic value and were only a summary of their 
performance as part of their research participation.    
 
Due to the lengthy nature of the testing process, there was an increased 
likelihood of fatigue. Accordingly, participants were reminded that they could take 
a break at any point.   
 
3.2. Recruitment  
 
Six online social networks were e-mailed to request permission to advertise the 
study via a poster (Appendix 13) on their platform, the study was re-advertised on 
these platforms up to three times. Four participants were recruited via the ‘Meet 
Up’ platform and three participants were recruited via ‘Facebook’ groups. Twelve 
Autism Charities, and two generic mental health charities were contacted to ask 
for the study to by advertised. Each charity was contacted up to three times to 
follow up about the request. Three charities agreed to advertise the study further, 
however, no participants responded to these advertisements. Five further 
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participants were recruited via word of mouth, however three of these meet ups 
were cancelled due to the government enforced quarantine measures 
implemented in response to the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic.  
 
3.2.1. Participants 
Eight participants with a diagnosis of ASD were recruited via advertisements to 
local charity organisations, social media platforms such as ‘Facebook’ and 
Internet forums and word of mouth.   
 
3.2.1.1. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Whilst it was desired for the study to be inclusive as possible, some restrictions 
needed to be made. The upper age limit was restricted to 65 because evidence 
suggests that ages beyond this point may confound the results of the 
neurocognitive test outcomes (Lezak, Howieson, Loring, Hannay, & Fischer, 
2004). The age limit of 65 could be argued to be an arbitrary number, however it 
is in keeping with the UK age of retirement and the typical lower age boundary for 
referral criteria for NHS older adult services. The other inclusion/exclusion criteria 
covered factors such as: substance misuse; serious mental health conditions and 
low educational attainment because of the significant impact these factors have 
on cognitive test outcomes (Lezak et al., 2004).  As discussed earlier, good 
English fluency and comprehension were also considered in inclusion factors 
because of this being a requirement for the testing due to this being required for 
the majority of the test and questionnaires. Similarly, individuals with low 
functioning ASD or Learning Difficulties were also excluded, as it was considered 
that the tests would have been too challenging to complete. Ethnicity and mild 
mental health problems, such as anxiety and depression were not exclusion 
factors.  
 
3.2.1.2. Inclusion criteria: 
• Having a diagnosis of ASD/Asperger’s syndrome 
• Being aged 18-65 
• Good fluency and comprehension of English 
• No diagnosis of a learning disability 
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3.2.1.3. Exclusion Criteria: 
• Current psychotic and/or serious mental illnesses  
• Current illicit substance use/misuse in the last 6 months 
• Learning Disability and/or (IQ <70)  
3.3. Procedure 
3.3.1. Consent 
Those interested in participating were given the option of meeting at their home, 
the UEL campus or in a quiet and private space near to where they live. The 
participants also had the choice of time day and time they would like to meet. On 
the day of testing, the participants’ capacity to consent was assessed and their 
written content was obtained. The participants were given an opportunity to ask 
any questions. Any travel expenses they incurred were also reimbursed at this 
point.  
 
3.3.2. Set Up 
The set up of the study was arranged so that that participant was sat opposite to 
the researcher on a table. For the neurocognitive tests and social cognitive 
measures (excluding TFG), the researcher asked the participants the questions 
and showed the stimuli to the participant, if required. Once the participant gave 
an answer, they wrote the answers in the record form. For the questionnaires, the 
participant was given the sheets to write their answers on. For TFG, a picture of 
the apparatus and set up can be seen in (Appendix 8).  
 
3.3.3. Cognitive Function 
As part of the validation process of TFG, in was important to determine that the 
participants’ scores on TFG were a result of their social cognitive abilities, as 
opposed to their general cognitive function are: executive functions (visual and 
verbal), verbal function, visuo-spatial functions; short term stores and working 
memory.  As discussed within the introduction, psychological theories of ASD 
suggest that executive function can impact upon the social cognitive functioning 
of individuals with ASD (Ozonoff et al., 1991). Accordingly, the participants’ 
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performances on the cognitive measures were analyzed to observe their affect 
the participant’s performance. Standardized verbal instructions were used to 
administrate the cognitive assessment. The instructions were written in the 
examiner’s handbook and were taken from the original manuals.   
 
3.3.4. Social Cognition 
As part of the validation process, two existing measures of social cognition were 
used to observe how the participants’ performances on these measures 
qualitatively compared to the new measure of social cognition, TFG. Due to there 
being no time limit to participate in TFG, this was administered last.   
 
3.3.5. Self-report Measures 
To assess for the impact of mood on participant’s performance, the participant 
was given two mood measures to complete. In order to compare the participants 
results to performances of individuals in the wider ASD population, the 
participant’s self-reported levels of cognitive and empathy and severity of ASD 
symptoms were assessed.  
 
3.3.6. Qualitative 
To record the social learning process, the participants were asked to provide a 
brief explanation for why they thought the answer that they selected was most in 
line with their own/’Ashley’s’ Set X personality trait. This helped to identify 
whether the participants were choosing a response based upon their own 
personality trait, ‘Ashley’s’, or for another reason.   
 
At the end of the game, the participants were asked four questions in order to 
review their experience of playing TFG. The interview schedule was as follows: 
 
· How did you find thinking about both yours and Ashley's personality? 
· How did your experience doing TFG compare to SS? 
· How does TFG compare to your experience of making friends in real life? 
· Do you have any further reflections on your experience of playing TFG? 
 
3.3.7. De-briefing 
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The assessment lasted on average 1.5-2 hours to complete. After the testing was 
completed, participants were debriefed and had the opportunity to receive a 
summary of their performance using sensitively worded qualitative descriptions. 
The summary highlighted the participants’ relative strengths and weaknesses.   
 
3.5. Apparatus 
The following tests, assessments and questionnaires were used to collect the 
data: 
 
3.5.1. Demographic Information 
3.5.1.1. Age: The participants’ age was collected in years and months in order to 
make an accurate comparison with normative data and to obtain an age adjusted 
scaled score.  
 
3.5.1.2. Education: The participants’ number of years in education was collected 
because of the effect they this has on cognitive assessment outcome (Lezak et 
al., 2004).  
 
3.5.1.3. Sex: The participant’s sex was recorded because of evidence indicating 
that there are different ASD profiles in men compared to women. 
 
3.5.1.4. Ethnicity: Participants were asked to record their ethnicity.  
 
3.5.2. Cognitive Assessment Test Battery 
 
The cognitive assessment test battery was included to ensure that any problems 
observed on TFG were not secondary to primary cognitive weakness.  
 
3.5.2.1. Optimal Ability Screen 
The Test of Pre-morbid functioning (TOPF) UK version (Wechsler, 2011), was 
used to assess reading ability. This also provided a brief assessment of the 
literacy/reading skills required for the rest of the assessments in the study. The 
task asked participants to read out 70 single words. The results were then 
converted into a prediction of the participant’s full scale IQ.  
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3.5.2.2. Short-Term Stores & Working Memory  
The digit span subtest of the WAIS -IV (Wechsler, 1997) was used to assess 
short-term memory and working memory. There were three parts to these tasks. 
In the first part, the participants were instructed to repeat a string of numbers in 
the same order (forward span), in the second part the participants were instructed 
to repeat the string of words in reverse order (backwards span). In the third part, 
the participants were instructed to repeat the string of numbers starting with the 
lowest number first then proceeding upwards (sequencing). Each trial starts with 
a string of two numbers increasing by one up to a maximum of 8 or 9 numbers. 
Each trial consists of two strings with equal numbers. The test is discontinued if 
participants fail to answer correctly on both strings within the same trial.  On each 
part, a score of 16 can be achieved; meaning a total score of 48 is possible when 
combined. 
 
3.5.2.3. Executive Functioning - Visual  
The Matrices Reasoning subtest of the WAIS- IV (Wechsler, 1997) was used as a 
measure of the participants’ visual reasoning ability. The participants were 
required to look at a visual pattern that was missing a piece of the pattern. They 
were instructed to select a piece from five options to complete the pattern. The 
total number of correct responses created a ‘Visual Reasoning’ total score’.  
 
3.5.2.4. Executive Function - Verbal 
The Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (DKEFS: Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 
2001) was used as a measure of the participant’s asemantic and phonetic fluency 
as well as switching ability.  
 
There were three parts to the tasks. In the Letter (Phonemic) fluency subset 
participants were given one minute to name as many words beginning with the 
letters ‘F’, ‘A’’ and ‘S’. The rules meant that the participants needed to go as 
quickly as they could, but not use the names of people, places, or the same 
words with different endings. All three scores were combined to produce a raw 
total ‘Letter fluency’ score.  
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In the category (Semantic) fluency subset participants were asked to repeat the 
process but with categories. They were given a category and asked to produce 
as many words belonging to that category in one minute. There were two trials, 
and the categories included (Animals) and (Boy’s Names). Both scores from the 
trials were combined to produce a raw total ‘Category Fluency’ score. 
 
In the Category switching subset participants were given two categories (Fruit) 
and (Furniture) and asked to switch between the two as they listed them as 
quickly as they could. The total number of correct items of fruit and furniture 
produced a ‘Switch Total’ raw score. The number of correct switches between the 
categories produced a ‘Switch Accuracy’ total raw score. 
 
3.5.3. Social Cognitive Test Battery 
 
3.5.3.1. Facial Emotional Recognition 
Reading the Mind in the Eye Test (RMET) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) was used 
to provide an indication of the ASD diagnosis severity. Participant performance 
on RMET was used as a form a qualitative validation of TFG.  
 
3.5.3.2. Non-literal Language 
Social Stories (SS) (Happé, 1994) consisted of eight short stories and a question 
that asked about the intentionality of the character in the story. Performance on 
SS was also used as a form a qualitative validation of TFG.  
 
3.5.4. Questionnaires 
The Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE) (Reniers, 
Corcoran, Drake, Shryane & Vollm, 2011) was used as an indication of ASD 
severity. Performance on this measure was also used as a form a qualitative 
validation of TFG. 
 
The Autism Spectrum Quotient Test (AQ) (Woodbury-Smith, 2005) was used as 
a self-report measure of ASD severity. Performance on this measure was also 
used as a form a qualitative validation of TFG. 
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3.5.5. Mood Measures 
Low mood and anxiety can both influence the participant’s test performance of 
cognitive and cognitive measures (Lezak et al., 2004). Accordingly, the GAD-7 
was used to assess the participants’ levels of anxiety (Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams, 
& Löwe, 2006) and the PHQ-9 (Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001) were used to 
assess the participants’ levels of depression. The results from these 
questionnaires were used to observe any impact of mood and anxiety on the 
participant’s performance on the cognitive assessments and social cognitive 
tests.  
 
3.6. Analysis 
 
3.6.1. Quantitative 
The quantitative data was formed of questionnaires, cognitive and social 
cognition batteries. The data (raw scores, scaled scores or composite scores) 
were encrypted and entered into an SPSS (version 26.0) spreadsheet. The data 
was assembled into a series of tables and graphs in order to make inferences 
about their performance on TFG.  
 
The data from each answer on TFG was entered onto an encrypted Excel 
spreadsheet. To assess construct validity of TFG, the answer responses selected 
by participants were compared to the correct answers to identify any anomalies in 
the answer responses’ ability to address the ToM construct.   
 
3.6.2. Qualitative 
3.6.2.1. Transcription 
The participants’ verbal answer responses and feedback to the TFG were 
recorded verbatim through writing their responses as they spoke. They were then 
transcribed onto an encrypted Excel document. Transcripts were written to the 
participant’s code anomalously to protect their identity.  
 
3.6.2.2. Content Analysis 
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A Content Analysis (Erlingsson & Brysiewicz, 2017) was used to generate a 
preliminary understanding of the participants verbal answer responses to the 
social scenarios in relation to their own and/or Ashley’s personality traits. A 
content analysis was chosen as an approach because it is not aligned with a 
particular philosophical tradition, which meant that there was flexibility in the 
approach by which the data could be analysed (Erlingsson & Brysiewicz, 2017).  
 
The results from this analysis were used to further assess the construct validity of 
TFG. This was achieved through considering whether their answers indicated 
that participants correctly applied a ToM approach to answer the questions. The 
answers that did not demonstrate a correct application of ToM were also 
analysed to consider whether this was due to the participant not engaging with 
the measure, or whether it was due to errors made in their application of ToM. 
The results from the content analysis will also be used to derive a preliminarily 
scoring system for TFG. 
 
The following steps were taken to analyse the data: 
1. Theme 
2. Category 
3. Code 
4. Condensed Meaning Unit 
5. Meaning Unit 
 
An abductive approach (Graneheim, Lindgren, & Lundman, 2017) was taken to 
analyse the data. Initially, the meaning units and codes were abstracted from the 
answer responses. The categories induced from this data were then used to 
derive a preliminary scoring system for TFG. For the highest level of abstraction, 
a deductive approach was taken to organise the categories into two overarching 
themes: “Evidence of correct application of ToM” and “No evidence or incorrect 
application of ToM”. The data was then used to assess the construct validity of 
the application of ToM as a measurable construct. The academic supervisor 
informally verified the induced categories and deduced themes.  
  
3.6.2.3. Thematic Analysis 
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Similar to the content analysis, the thematic analysis was chosen as a method 
because it does not align with a particular philosophical position (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). As such, it is coherent with the critical realist philosophical position 
because it assumes that the ToM construct is a real entity that can be measured 
whilst also addressing the relativity of the ToM construct.  
 
The results from this analysis were used to further assess the face validity of the 
friendship. This includes whether TFG is considered a challenging and engaging 
measure of ToM. The responses will also assess the ecological validity of TFG, in 
regards to its representativeness of every day difficulties in social interaction 
experienced by individuals with a diagnosis of HF ASD. Furthermore, the 
participant feedback will be used to consider the longer-term ambition of TFG 
being used to inform interventions in social interaction with the HF ASD 
population. 
 
The analysis was conducted in line with Braun and Clarke's (2006) six stage 
model:  
1. Familiarizing yourself with your data  
2. Generating initial codes  
3. Searching for themes  
4. Reviewing themes  
5. Defining and naming themes  
6. Producing the report  
 
The themes were abstracted by the researcher using a data-driven induction 
approach (Parker, 2004), where similarities and differences within the data were 
observed, then described in terms of categories and themes. The academic 
supervisor informally verified the themes. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 1 
 
4.1 Demographic Information 
Displayed within Table 1. is the group level demographic information for the 
participants within the study. The information is displayed on a group level in 
order to maintain the anonymity of the participant identities. In total, five men and 
three women participated in the study. All participants were white and all but one 
participant were of British origin. The youngest participant was aged 29 and the 
oldest 64. Six participants undertook further education beyond age 18 years. The 
demographic information for each participant was used to calculate the scaled 
scores for the participants’ performances on the cognitive and social cognitive 
measures. 
 
Table 1.  
Combined participant demographic information 
Sex Number 
Male 5 
Female 3 
Ethnicity  
White, British 7 
White, Swedish 1 
Age  
29 1 
30 1 
31 3 
32 1 
51 1 
64 1 
Years in Education  
13 2 
16 3 
17 2 
20 1 
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4.2 Individual Descriptive Summaries of Results and Performance  
 
The following section gives each the participants’ individual raw and scaled 
scores for the self-report measures, cognitive, social cognitive tests and TFG  
(Tables 2-9.). Each table will be followed by an independent summary of the 
participants’ results and performances. Firstly, the participants results on the 
GAD-7 and PHQ-9 will be discussed to assess the likelihood of mood impacting 
upon their performance. Secondly, the participants’ relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the Cognitive Tests (WAIS-IV subscales and DKEFS-Verbal 
Fluency) will be discussed. Any underlying deficits that may impact upon the 
participant’s performance on the social cognitive tests will also be noted.  
Following this, participants results on the QCAE and AQ will be discussed to see 
how their results compare to the wider ASD population. Similarly their 
performances on the established tests of social cognition (WACS-AF and SSQ), 
will then be discussed to see how their results compare to the wider ASD 
population. Finally, the participant’s performance on the new measure of social 
cognition, TFG, will be discussed.  
 
Where possible, scaled scores were derived from raw scores ( Mean = 10, SD = 
3) to validate performance relative to peers matched as far as possible for age 
and or sex. Verbal interpretation of these scores is provided for the reader. 
Where scores are ‘Below Normal’ or ‘Impaired’, that would indicate a cognitive 
deficit or weakness of sufficient severity to impact upon TFG performance and 
warrants being taken into account when interpreting performance.  
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4.2.1. Participant 01 
Table 2.  
P01 performance on the self-report measures, Cognitive test battery and Social 
Cognition test battery 
Test Component 
Raw 
Score 
Scaled 
Score 
Interpretation 
QCAE Cognitive 40   5 Below-normal 
 Affective 35 11 Average 
AQ Social Skill 18   4 Below-normal 
 Attention Switching 19   8 Average 
 Attention to detail 23 12 High-average 
 Communication 20   7 Low-average 
 Imagination 22   9 Average 
TOPF (Correct) 54 10 Average 
WAIS Digit Span 19   5 Below-normal 
 Similarities 24   9 Average 
 Matrix Reasoning 12   6 Low-average 
DKEFS Letter Fluency 28   7 Low-average 
 Category Fluency 38   9 Average 
 Switch Output 11   6 Low-average 
 Switch Accuracy 11   9 Average 
WACS-AF (Correct)   -   - - 
SSQ 
Mental State 
(Correct) 
14 11 Average 
TFG Total 13 -- -- 
 Own   5 -- -- 
 Ashley   8 -- -- 
GAD-7 (anxiety)   7 -- Moderate 
PHQ-9 (depression)   6 -- Moderate 
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4.2.1.1 Summary 
The participant’s scores on the GAD-7 and PHQ-9 indicate ‘Moderate’ levels of 
anxiety and depression. Accordingly, there was some possibility of mood 
impacting upon the participant’s performance. However, no concerns with mood 
were observed on the day of testing. 
 
There were no concerns regarding the participant’s reading abilities. Their 
relative strengths were in concept formation and the task setting and switching 
tasks. They had relative strengths in the verbal abstraction task in comparison to 
the visual abstraction tasks, indicating that they may be better at processing 
verbal in comparison to visual information. However, their relative weaknesses 
were in the attention and working memory. Their performance indicated that the 
participant may experience difficulties with sustaining attention, initiating a task 
and monitoring their performance. However, there were no further concerns that 
any underlying cognitive difficulties would impact upon their performance on the 
tests of social cognition. 
 
Similar to previous research within the ASD population, the participants’ 
performance on the QCAE indicated a poorer score of Cognitive Empathy, which 
was ‘Below Normal’ for the same sex peers , in comparison to their Affective 
Empathy which was ‘Average’. The participant’s AQ subscale scores indicate that 
they have significant difficulty with social skill, but overall their autistic tendencies 
are relatively mild in comparison to the wider ASD population. Unfortunately, the 
WACS-AF was not completed due to an administration error on the day of 
testing. The participant performed in the ‘Average’ range on the Mental State 
subtest of the SSQ in comparison to same age peers. Both performances 
indicate that the participant demonstrated no deficit in social cognitive 
performance based on these tests.   
 
The participant scored 13 out of a total 21 points on TFG. They gave a higher 
number of correct responses when considering Ashley’s personality traits than 
when they were considering their own, scoring 8 and 5 points respectively. This 
suggests that the participant had some difficulty in their performance of this test. 
The potential reasons for this will be explored within the discussion. 
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4.2.2. Participant 02 
Table 3.  
P02 performance on the self-report measures, Cognitive test battery and Social 
Cognition test battery 
Test Component 
Raw 
Score 
Scaled 
Score 
Interpretation 
QCAE Cognitive 39 1 Impaired 
 Affective 30 5 Below Normal 
AQ Social Skill 27 4 Below Normal 
 Attention Switching 24 8 Average 
 Attention to detail 22 10 Average 
 Communication 22 0 Impaired 
 Imagination 26 7 Low Average 
TOPF (Correct) 62 12 High Average 
WAIS Digit Span 27 9 Average 
 Similarities 27 11 Average 
 Matrix Reasoning 20 11 Average 
DKEFS Letter Fluency 30 7 Low Average 
 Category Fluency 50 14 Superior 
 Switch Output 16 14 Superior 
 Switch Accuracy 16 4 Below Normal 
WACS-AF (Correct) 17 8 Average 
SSQ 
Mental State 
(Correct) 
13 10 Average 
TFG Total 20 -- -- 
 Own 11 -- -- 
 Ashley 9 -- -- 
GAD-7 (anxiety) 15 -- 
Moderately 
Severe 
PHQ-9 (depression) 6 -- Moderate 
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4.2.2.1 Summary 
The participant’s scores on the GAD-7 and PHQ-9 indicate ‘Moderately Severe’ 
levels of anxiety and ‘Moderate’ levels of depression. Accordingly, there was 
some possibility of mood impacting upon the participant’s performance. However, 
no concerns with mood were observed on the day of testing. 
 
The participant’s performance in the neuropsychological test battery indicated 
that there were no concerns regarding the participants’ reading abilities. There 
were no differences in their verbal and visual abstraction performances, 
indicating that there were no relative advantages in visual or verbal processing of 
information. Their relative strengths were in sustained task setting and switching. 
Their relative weaknesses were in attention and working memory.  Overall, there 
were no indication of deficits in ability that would impact upon their performance 
on the tests of social cognition. 
 
Similar to previous research within the ASD population, the participant’s results 
on the QCAE indicated a poorer Cognitive Empathy score, which was in the  
‘Impaired’ range for the same sex, in comparison to their Affective Empathy 
score, which was in the ‘Below Normal’ range for the same age and sex peers. 
The participant’s AQ subscale scores indicate that they have significant difficulty 
social and communication skills, but overall their autistic tendencies are relatively 
mild in comparison to the wider ASD population. The participant scored within the 
‘Average’ range on WACS-AF, in comparison to same aged peers. The 
participant performed in the ‘Average’ Range on the mental state subtest of the 
SSQ, in comparison to same age peers.  Both performances indicate that the 
participant demonstrated no deficit in social cognitive performance based on 
these tests.   
 
The participant scored 20 out of a total 21 points on TFG. They gave a higher 
number of correct responses when considering their own personality traits than 
when they were considering Ashley’s, scoring 11 and 9 points respectively. This 
suggests that the participant had almost no difficulty in their performance of this 
test. The potential reasons for this will be explored within the discussion. 
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4.2.3. Participant 03 
Table 04.  
P03 performance on the self-report measures, Cognitive test battery and Social 
Cognition test battery 
 
Test Component 
Raw 
Score 
Scaled 
Score 
Interpretation 
QCAE Cognitive 54 7 Low Average 
 Affective 42 14 Superior 
AQ Social Skill 26 3 Impaired 
 Attention Switching 27 8 Average 
 Attention to detail 28 10 Average 
 Communication 25 10 Average 
 Imagination 19 5 Below Normal 
TOPF (Correct) 44 9 Average 
WAIS Digit Span 19 5 Below Normal 
 Similarities 11 11 Average 
 Matrix Reasoning 13 7 Low Average 
DKEFS Letter Fluency 30 7 Low Average 
 Category Fluency 50 14 Superior 
 Switch Output 24 16 Superior 
 Switch Accuracy 16 4 Below Normal 
WACS-AF (Correct) 15 5 Below Normal 
SSQ 
Mental State 
(Correct) 
13 10 Average 
TFG Total 20 -- -- 
 Own 10 -- -- 
 Ashley 10 -- -- 
GAD-7 (anxiety) 2 -- Mild 
PHQ-9 (depression) 4 -- Mild 
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4.2.3.1. Summary 
The participant’s scores on the GAD-7 and PHQ-9 indicate ‘Mild’ levels of anxiety 
and ‘Mild’ levels of depression. Therefore, there was a low likelihood of mood 
impacting upon the participant’s performance. No concerns with mood were 
observed on the day of testing. 
There were no concerns regarding the participant’s reading abilities. Their 
relative strengths were in the task setting and switching tasks. They had relative 
strengths in the verbal abstraction task in comparison to the visual abstraction 
tasks, indicating that they may be better at processing verbal compared to visual 
information. However, their relative weaknesses were in the sustained attention 
and working memory tasks. There was no indication of deficits in ability that 
would impact upon their performance on the tests of social cognition. 
 
Similar to previous research within the ASD population, the participant’s results 
on the QCAE indicated a poorer score of Cognitive Empathy, which was in the 
‘Low Average’ range for the same sex peers, in comparison to their Affective 
Empathy, which was in the ‘Superior’ range for the same sex peers.  Similar to 
previous research, the participant’s results on the QCAE indicated a poorer 
Cognitive Empathy score, which was in the  ‘Below Normal’ range for the same 
sex peers, in comparison to their Affective Empathy score, which was in the ‘Low 
Average’ range for the same sex peers. The participant’s AQ subscale scores 
indicate that they have significant difficulties with social skill and imagination, but 
overall their autistic tendencies are relatively mild in comparison to the wider ASD 
population. The participant scored within the ‘Below Normal’ range on WACS-AF 
in comparison to same ages peers. This offers some suggestion of deficits in 
social cognitive ability. However, the participant performed in the ‘Average’ range 
on the mental state subtest of the SSQ, in comparison to same ages peers, 
indicating no deficits in social cognitive performance.  
 
The participant scored 20 out of a total 21 points on TFG. There was no 
difference in  correct responses when considering Ashley’s personality traits in 
comparison to their own, scoring 10 points for both. This suggests that the 
participant had almost no difficulty in their performance of this test. The potential 
reasons for this will be explored within the discussion. 
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4.2.4. Participant 04 
Table 05.  
P04 performance on the self-report measures, Cognitive test battery and Social 
Cognition test battery. 
Test Component 
Raw 
Score 
Scaled 
Score 
Interpretation 
QCAE Cognitive 34 4 Below Normal 
 Affective 12 1 Impaired 
AQ Social Skill 21 6 Low Average 
 Attention Switching 21 5 Below Normal 
 Attention to detail 26 12 High Average 
 Communication 26 12 High Average 
 Imagination 24 8 Average 
TOPF (Correct) 17 8 Average 
WAIS Digit Span 5 6 Low Average 
 Similarities 8 8 Average 
 Matrix Reasoning 10 13 High Average 
DKEFS Letter Fluency 51 17 Very Superior 
 Category Fluency 39 12 High Average 
 Switch Output 14 13 High Average 
 Switch Accuracy 14 12 High Average 
WACS-AF (Correct) 17 8 Average 
SSQ 
Mental State 
(Correct) 
13 10 Average 
TFG Total 18 -- -- 
 Own 8 -- -- 
 Ashley 10 -- -- 
GAD-7 (anxiety) 9 -- Moderate 
PHQ-9 (depression) 14 -- 
Moderately 
Severe 
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4.2.4.1. Summary 
The participant’s scores on the GAD-7 and PHQ-9 indicate ‘Moderate’ levels of 
anxiety and ‘Moderately Severe’ levels of depression. During testing the 
participant appeared slightly anxious. To help manage this, the participant took 
some short breaks in-between the tests.  Accordingly, the participant’s mood may 
have impacted upon their performance.  
 
There were no concerns regarding the participant’s reading abilities. Their 
relative strengths were in visual abstraction. Their relative weaknesses were in 
attention and working memory.  Their results indicated that the participant may 
find it easier to process visual information in comparison to verbal information. 
Overall, there was no indication of deficits in ability that would impact upon their 
performance on the tests of social cognition. 
 
In contrast to previous research within the ASD population, the participant’s 
results on the QCAE indicated poorer Affective Empathy, which scored within the 
‘Impaired’ range for the same sex, than Cognitive Empathy, which scored within 
the ‘Below Normal’ range for the same sex. The participant’s AQ subscale scores 
indicate that their autistic tendencies are relatively mild in comparison to the 
wider ASD population. The participant scored within the ‘Average’ range on 
WACS-AF, indicating that the participant had no difficulties with their performance 
on this test. The participant also performed in the ‘Average’ range on the mental 
state component of the SSQ, which is in comparison to same age peers. Both 
performances indicate that the participant demonstrated no deficit in social 
cognitive performance based on these tests.   
 
The participant scored 18 out of a total 21 points on TFG. They gave a higher 
number of correct responses when considering their Ashley’s personality traits 
than when they were considering their own, scoring 8 and 10 points respectively. 
This suggests that the participant had almost no difficulty in their performance of 
this test. The potential reasons for this will be explored within the discussion. 
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4.2.5. Participant 05 
Table 06.  
P05 performance on the self-report measures, Cognitive test battery and Social 
Cognition test battery 
 
Test Component 
Raw 
Score 
Scaled 
Score 
Interpretation 
QCAE Cognitive 36 4   Below Normal 
 Affective 25 7 Low Average 
AQ Social Skill 19   4 Below Normal 
 Attention Switching 25   11 Average 
 Attention to detail 24 9 Average 
 Communication 23  5  Below Normal 
 Imagination 21   6 Low Average 
TOPF (Correct) 24 13 High Average 
WAIS Digit Span 27   17 Very Superior 
 Similarities 22   17 Very Superior 
 Matrix Reasoning 34  9 Average 
DKEFS Letter Fluency 30   8 Average 
 Category Fluency 36   9 Average 
 Switch Output 12   8 Average 
 Switch Accuracy 12 10   Average 
WACS-AF (Correct)  17 9   Average 
SSQ 
Mental State 
(Correct) 
16 14 Superior 
TFG Total 19 -- -- 
 Own   9 -- -- 
 Ashley   10 -- -- 
GAD-7 (anxiety)   13 -- Moderate 
PHQ-9 (depression)   15 -- Mild 
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4.2.5.2. Summary 
The participant’s scores on the GAD-7 and PHQ-9 indicate ‘Moderate’ levels of 
anxiety and ‘Mild’ levels of depression. Accordingly, there was some potential of 
mood impacting upon the participant’s performance. However, no concerns with 
mood were observed on the day of testing. 
 
There were no concerns regarding the participant’s reading abilities. Their 
relative strengths were in verbal abstraction. Their relative weaknesses were in 
the visual abstraction and the attention setting and switching tasks. Their results 
indicated that the participant may find it easier to process verbal information in 
comparison to visual information. Overall, there was no indication of deficits in 
ability that would impact upon their performance on the tests of social cognition. 
 
Similar to previous research within the ASD population, the participant’s results 
on the QCAE indicated poorer Cognitive Empathy than Affective Empathy, 
however both scored within the ‘Average’ range for the same sex.  The 
participant’s AQ subscale scores indicate that they have significant difficulties 
with social skill, but overall their autistic tendencies are relatively mild in 
comparison to the wider ASD population. The participant scored within the 
‘Average’ range on WACS-AF, indicating that the participant had very minor 
difficulties with their performance on this test. The participant scored 16 out of a 
total 16 points on the SSQ, which indicates that they performed ‘Superior’ in 
comparison to same age peers.  
 
The participant scored 19 out of a total 21 points on TFG. They gave a higher 
number of correct responses when considering Ashley’s personality traits than 
when they were considering their own, scoring 10 and 9 points respectively. This 
suggests that the participant had almost no difficulty in their performance of this 
test. The potential reasons for this will be explored within the discussion. 
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4.2.6. Participant 06 
Table 07.  
P06 performance on the self-report measures, Cognitive test battery and Social 
Cognition test battery. 
 
Test Component 
Raw 
Score 
Scaled 
Score 
Interpretation 
QCAE Cognitive 36 4 Below Normal 
 Affective 25 7 Low Average 
AQ Social Skill 24 4 Below Normal 
 Attention Switching 23 11 Average 
 Attention to detail 20 9 Average 
 Communication 24 5 Below Normal 
 Imagination 29 6 Low Average 
TOPF (Correct) 24 13 High Average 
WAIS Digit Span 27 17 Very Superior 
 Similarities 22 17 Very Superior 
 Matrix Reasoning 34 9 Average 
DKEFS Letter Fluency 30 8 Average 
 Category Fluency 36 9 Average 
 Switch Output 12 8 Average 
 Switch Accuracy 12 10 Average 
WACS-AF (Correct) 19 9 Average 
SSQ 
Mental State 
(Correct) 
16 14 Superior 
TFG Total 10 -- -- 
 Own  3 -- -- 
 Ashley   7 -- -- 
GAD-7 (anxiety)   13 -- High Average 
PHQ-9 (depression)   15 -- Superior 
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4.2.6.1. Summary 
The participant’s scores on the GAD-7 and PHQ-9 indicate ‘Moderately Severe’ 
levels of anxiety and ‘Moderately Severe’ levels of depression. Accordingly, there 
was possibility of mood impacting upon the participant’s performance. However, 
no concerns with mood were observed on the day of testing. 
 
There were no concerns regarding the participant’s reading abilities. Their 
relative strengths were in the sustained attention and working memory tasks and 
in the verbal fluency tasks. Their relative weaknesses were in task setting and 
switching tasks. Their results indicated that the participant may find it easier to 
process verbal information in comparison to visual information. Overall, there was 
no indication of deficits in ability that would impact upon their performance on the 
tests of social cognition.  
 
Similar to previous research within the ASD population, the participant’s results 
on the QCAE indicated a poorer Cognitive Empathy score, which was in the  
‘Below Normal’ range for the same sex, in comparison to their Affective Empathy 
score, which was in the ‘Low Average’ range for the same sex. The participant’s 
AQ subscale scores indicate that they have significant difficulties with social skill 
and communication. Overall their scores are in line with the average results for 
the wider ASD population. The participant scored within the ‘Superior’ range on 
WACS-AF, in comparison to same age peers. They also scored in the ‘Superior’ 
range on the mental state subtest of the SSQ, in comparison to same age peers. 
Both performances indicate that the participant demonstrated no deficit in social 
cognitive performance based on these tests.   
 
The participant scored 10 out of a total 21 points on TFG. They gave a higher 
number of correct responses when considering their own personality traits than 
when they were considering Ashley’s, scoring 7 and 3 points respectively. This 
suggests that the participant had some difficult in their performance of this test. 
The potential reasons for this will be explored within the discussion. 
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4.2.7.Participant 07 
Table 08.  
P07 performance on the self-report measures, Cognitive test battery and Social 
Cognition test battery 
 
Test Component 
Raw 
Score 
Scaled 
Score 
Interpretation 
QCAE Cognitive 50 8   Average 
 Affective 30 9 Average 
AQ Social Skill 23 6   Low Average 
 Attention Switching 20  9  Average 
 Attention to detail 21 8 Average 
 Communication 23  2  Impaired 
 Imagination 30   1 Impaired 
TOPF (Correct) 12 13 High Average 
WAIS Digit Span 13 10   Average 
 Similarities 14   16 Superior 
 Matrix Reasoning 19  10 Average 
DKEFS Letter Fluency 14   13 High Average 
 Category Fluency 13   10 Average 
 Switch Output 14   6 Low Average 
 Switch Accuracy 19   9 Average 
WACS-AF (Correct) 23   15   Superior 
SSQ 
Mental State 
(Correct) 
15 12 High Average 
TFG Total 13 -- -- 
 Own   7 -- -- 
 Ashley   6 -- -- 
GAD-7 (anxiety)  21  -- Severe 
PHQ-9 (depression)  6  -- Moderate 
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4.2.7.1. Summary 
The participant’s scores on the GAD-7 and PHQ-9 indicate ‘Severe’ levels of 
anxiety and ‘Moderate’ levels of depression. Accordingly, there likelihood of mood 
impacting upon the participant’s performance. However, no concerns with mood 
were observed on the day of testing. 
 
There were no concerns regarding the participant’s reading abilities. Their 
relative strengths were in verbal abstraction. Their relative weaknesses were in 
the task setting and switching tasks. Their results indicated that the participant 
may find it easier to process verbal information in comparison to visual 
information. Overall, there was no indication of deficits in ability that would impact 
upon their performance on the tests of social cognition. 
 
Similar to previous research within the ASD population, the participant’s results 
on the QCAE indicated a poorer score of Cognitive Empathy than Affective 
Empathy, however both scored within the ‘Average’ range for the same sex.   
The participant scored in the ‘Borderline’ severity range on the AQ. .  The 
participant’s AQ subscale scores indicate that they have significant difficulties 
with social skill and communication, but overall their autistic tendencies are 
relatively mild in comparison to the wider ASD population. The participant 
performed within the ‘Superior’ range on WACS-AF in comparison to same age 
peers. The participant also performed in the ‘high average’ range 15 on the 
mental state component of the SSQ in comparison to same age peers. Both 
performances indicate that the participant demonstrated no deficit in social 
cognitive performance based on these tests.   
 
The participant scored 16 out of a total 21 points on TFG. They gave a higher 
number of correct responses when considering their own personality traits than 
when they were considering Ashley’s, scoring 7 and 6 points respectively.  This 
suggests that the participant had some difficult in their performance of this test. 
The potential reasons for this will be explored within the discussion. 
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4.2.8. Participant 08 
Table 9.  
P08 performance on the self-report measures, Cognitive test battery and Social 
Cognition test battery 
Test Component 
Raw 
Score 
Scaled 
Score 
Interpretation 
QCAE Cognitive 43 2 Impaired 
 Affective 32 5 Below Normal 
AQ Social Skill 24 6 Low Average 
 Attention Switching 23 9 Average 
 Attention to detail 25 8 Average 
 Communication 21 2 Impaired 
 Imagination 26 1 Impaired 
TOPF (Correct) 6 12 High Average 
WAIS Digit Span 7 11 Low Average 
 Similarities 8 17 Average 
 Matrix Reasoning 10 11 Average 
DKEFS Letter Fluency 50 13 High Average 
 Category Fluency 37 9 Average 
 Switch Output 12 8 Average 
 Switch Accuracy 12 10 Average 
WACS-AF (Correct) 20 11 Average 
SSQ 
Mental State 
(Correct) 
16 14 Superior 
TFG Total 15 -- -- 
 Own 6 -- -- 
 Ashley 9 -- -- 
GAD-7 (anxiety) 7 -- Moderate 
PHQ-9 (depression) 5 -- Mild 
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4.2.8.1 Summary 
The participant’s scores on the GAD-7 and PHQ-9 indicate ‘Moderate’ levels of 
anxiety and ‘Mild’ levels of depression. Accordingly, there was some potential of 
mood affecting the participant’s performance. However, no concerns with mood 
were observed on the day of testing. 
 
There were no concerns regarding the participant’s reading abilities. Their 
relative strengths were in the verbal fluency. Their relative weaknesses were in 
task setting and switching. Their results indicated that the participant may find it 
easier to process verbal information in comparison to visual information. Overall, 
there was no indication of deficits in ability that would impact upon their 
performance on the tests of social cognition. 
 
Similar to previous research within the ASD population, the participant’s results 
on the QCAE indicated a poorer score of Cognitive Empathy which was  
‘Impaired’ for the same sex, in comparison to their Affective Empathy was ‘Below 
Normal’ for the same sex. The participant’s AQ subscale scores indicate that they 
have significant difficulties with communication and imagination. Overall their 
scores are in line with the average results for the wider ASD population. The 
participant scored within the ‘Average’ range on WACS-AF in comparison to 
same aged peers. The participant also scored in the ‘Superior’ range on the 
mental state subtest of the SSQ, in comparison to same age peers. Both 
performances indicate that the participant demonstrated no deficit in social 
cognitive performance based on these tests.   
 
The participant scored 10 out of a total 21 points on TFG. They gave a higher 
number of correct responses when considering Ashley’s personality traits than 
when they were considering their own, scoring 9 and 6 points respectively.  This 
suggests that the participant had some difficult in their performance of this test. 
The potential reasons for this will be explored within the discussion. 
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Figure 2. 
A bar chart of the collective participant scaled scores across tests 
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Displayed in Figure 2 is a bar chart of all the participant scaled scores across the 
tests. The scores that fall below the red horizontal line show the participant 
scores that were ‘Impaired’ and scores below the orange horizontal line show the 
participant scores that were ‘Below Normal’. The figure shows that the majority of 
the participants’ Cognitive Assessment performances fall above these ranges, 
suggesting that difficulties in TFG was unlikely to be through underlying cognitive 
weaknesses. Some participants’ scores indicated some underlying cognitive 
difficulties with sustained attention and switching attention between tasks. Whilst 
this may have impacted upon their individual performance on TFG, their scores 
did not appear to be consistently lower than the other participants scores on this 
measure (see individual summaries for TFG scores).  
The results for the QCAE indicate that the all but one participant demonstrated 
poorer Cognitive Empathy than Affective Empathy, which is in keeping with 
previous findings with the ASD population. On the AQ, the lowest self-reported 
scores are for Social Skill, Communication and Imagination and the higher self-
reported scores for Attention Switching and Attention to Detail, which is keeping 
with the ASD diagnostic criteria (APA, 2015).  
The participant performances on the previous measures of social cognition, 
WACS-AF and SSQ indicate that the majority of the participants scored within 
Normal Ranges for this measure, apart from one participant who scored ‘Below 
Normal’ for their performance on WACS-AF.  
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 2 
 
 
5.1 Content Analysis 
 
In order to assess the face validity of TFG and to derive a scoring system, the 
participant’s responses were analysed using a content analysis method 
(Erlingsson & Brysiewicz, 2017). As discussed within the methodology, ToM is 
the underlying construct that the TFG is adhering. Accordingly, it was important to 
assess the face validity of TFG by documenting the nature, variety and frequency 
of answer responses given in the three Chapters of TFG. As such, the answer 
responses for each chapter have been categorised by the researcher to be 
grouped into two themes: Theme One: “Correct Application of ToM” and Theme 
Two: “Incorrect or no evidence of application of ToM”. 
 
Each chapter of TFG was structured with a different format and objective, 
accordingly, the themes and categories derived from the content analysis were 
grouped according to Chapter. Table 9. displays a ‘map’ of the themes and 
categories that were derived by the researcher. In the following section, the 
categories have been discussed and illustrated via quotes of participants’ verbal 
responses. A quantitative summary of the number of responses per category and 
theme, for each chapter. 
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Table 10.  
Themes and categories derived from coded data 
Theme Category 
Chapter One 
Correct application 
of ToM 
Correct answer, correct intention 
Incorrect answer, correct intention 
Incorrect or no 
evidence of 
application of ToM 
Correct answer, ambiguous intention 
Correct answer, no evidence of ToM/ too easy 
Incorrect answer, incorrect intention 
Chapter Two 
Correct application 
of ToM 
Correct answer, correct intension 
Incorrect answer, correct intention 
Incorrect or no 
evidence of 
application of ToM 
Correct answer, ambiguous intention 
Correct answer, no evidence of ToM/ too easy 
Incorrect answer, incorrect intention 
Chapter Three 
Correct application 
of ToM 
Correct answer, correctly considers both perspectives 
Correct answer, only considers own perspective 
Incorrect answer, correctly considers one perspective 
Incorrect answer, correctly considers both perspective 
Incorrect or no 
evidence of 
application of 
Theory of Mind 
Correct answer, no evidence of ToM/ too easy 
Incorrect answer, incorrect intention 
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In the following section, participants’ quotes have been organised using a format 
that helps illustrate the personality set, perspective and trait to which the answers 
referred. The following format has been used to code the answer responses: 
 
Sample: P03, A, ‘Ashley’, Relaxed - “Sounded like ‘Ashley’ would be easy 
going, take things one at a time” 
 
Coding: 
• P03: Participant number  
• A: Personality Trait Set (A,B C, Prompt A&B, Prompt A&C, Prompt B&C, 
A&B, A&C or B&C) 
• ‘Ashley’: Answer in reference to participant or ‘Ashley’ 
• Relaxed: Correct personality trait  
 
5.2. Game Chapter One  
 
Objective: Can the participant use the personality trait prompts to learn how to 
select an answer response for themselves and ‘Ashley’, that is in line with their 
their own personality trait or ‘Ashley’s’? 
 
5.2.1 Theme One: Correct application of ToM 
 
5.2.1.1. Category One: Correct answer, correct intention 
This category has been perceived by the author to illustrate the answer 
responses that were correct and also demonstrate evidence of the participants 
theorising about their own mind and/or ‘Ashley’s, in relation to the selected 
personality trait.   
P03, A, ‘Ashley’, Relaxed: “Sounded like ‘Ashley’ would be easy going, take 
things one at a time” 
P04, C, ‘Ashley’, Autonomous: “ Because she is independent and self-assured” 
P07, C, ‘Ashley’, Autonomous: “She probably wouldn't want to be in a position 
where she would want to be with many people” 
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5.2.1.2. Category Two: Incorrect answer, correct intention 
This category has been perceived by the author to illustrate the answer 
responses that were incorrect, but demonstrate evidence of the participants 
correctly theorising about their own mind and/or ‘Ashley’s, in relation to the 
selected personality trait.   
P01, A, ‘Ashley’, Relaxed: “Sounded like ‘Ashley’ would be easy going, take 
things one at a time.” 
P01, B, Participant, Sensitive: “Because I am quite understanding and would try 
to figure out why someone would want a Tattoo” 
P04, A, ‘Ashley’, Disciplined: “I think they are probably organised and would plan” 
 
5.2.2. Theme Two: Incorrect or no evidence of application of ToM 
 
5.2.2.1. Category One: Correct Answer, ambiguous intension 
This category has been perceived by the author to illustrate the answer 
responses that were correct, but the rationale for selecting the answer was vague 
or unrelated to the selected personality trait.  
P01, C, ‘Ashley’, Gentle: “Because ‘Ashley’ is easy-going, so would do whatever 
tickles their fancy” 
P04, B, Participant, Strict: “I don't like tattoos” 
 
5.2.2.2. Category Two: Correct answer, no evidence of ToM too easy 
This category has been perceived by the author to illustrate the answer 
responses that were correct, but the participant was selecting their answers 
based upon matching words as opposed to theorising about their own or Ashley’s 
intentions in relation to the selected personality trait.   
P02, C, ‘Ashley’, Autonomous: “Because it’s what it says” 
P05, B, Participant, Sensitive: “I'm sensitive” 
P08, A, ‘Ashley’, Sincere: “Isn't it based upon the trait selected” 
 
5.2.2.3. Category Three: Incorrect Answer, incorrect intention 
This category has been perceived by the author to illustrate the answer 
responses that were incorrect and that the participants’ theorising about their own 
or Ashley’s intentions were not related to the selected personality trait.  
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P06, C, ‘Ashley’, Gentle: “Because ‘Ashley’ is easy-going, so would do whatever 
tickles their fancy” 
 
5.3 Game Chapter Two 
 
Objective: Can the participant theorise about their own mind and that of Ashley’s 
in order to select an answer response that is in line with their own personality 
trait? Can they also select an answer response that is in line with Ashley’s 
personality trait? 
 
5.3.1 Theme One: Correct application of ToM 
 
5.3.1.1 Category One: Correct answer, correct intension 
This category has been perceived by the author to illustrate the answer 
responses that were correct and also demonstrate evidence of the participants 
theorising about their own mind and/or ‘Ashley’s, based upon the selected 
personality trait.   
P03, A, Participant,  Relaxed: “Because it’s a carefree option - not making plans 
and taking it easy” 
P04, B, ‘Ashley’, Pragmatic: “Rather than upset the person you would give other 
solutions” 
P06, B, ‘Ashley’, Strict: “ She doesn't want to deviate from her schedule, she isn't 
concerned about the person falling over” 
 
5.3.1.2.Category Two: Wrong answer, correct intention 
This category has been perceived by the author to illustrate the answer 
responses that were incorrect, but demonstrate evidence of the participants 
correctly theorising about their own mind and/or ‘Ashley’s, in relation to the 
selected personality trait.   
P03, B, ‘Ashley’, Sensitive: “Because she would want to help” 
P05, C, Participant, Introverted: “I would choose this so I am not committing, so I 
can withdraw” 
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P07, C, ‘Ashley’, Autonomous: “ I think she is autonomous and wouldn't like to go 
with so many people there, I think she would also prefer to have alone time with a 
friend rather than going to the cinema to watch it” 
 
5.3.2. Theme Two: Incorrect or no evidence of application of ToM 
 
5.3.2.1 Category One: Correct Answer, ambiguous intention 
This category has been perceived by the author to illustrate the answer 
responses that were correct, but the rationale for selecting the answer was vague 
or unrelated to the selected personality trait.  
P02, B, ‘Ashley’, Curious: “This one sounded the most sensitive” 
P04, A, ‘Ashley’, Disciplined: “I have sussed ‘Ashley’ out now” 
P07, B, Participant, Pragmatic: “I think it will be too extreme to not be friends with 
them with the only issue being not wanting to drink” 
 
5.3.2.2. Category Two: Correct answer, no evidence of ToM/ too easy 
This category has been perceived by the author to illustrate the answer 
responses that were correct, but the participant was selecting their answers 
based upon matching words as opposed to theorising about their own or Ashley’s 
intentions in relation to the selected personality trait.   
P02, A, Participant, Relaxed: “Because it’s what it says” 
P02, B, ‘Ashley’, Sensitive: “This one sounded the most sensitive” 
P08, C, ‘Ashley’, Extroverted: “That's the most extroverted social option”  
 
5.3.2.3. Category Three: Wrong answer, wrong intention 
This category has been perceived by the author to illustrate the answer 
responses that were incorrect and that the participants’ theorising about their own 
or Ashley’s intentions were not related to the selected personality trait.  
P01, A, Participant, Relaxed: “They should contact their bank to make sure they 
have everything” 
P04, A, Participant, Disciplined: “Because I don't know enough about banks, they 
are the experts” 
P07: C, Participant, Extroverted: “It is better to go in a quiet time during the week, 
based upon ‘Ashley’ being an Autonomous person” 
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5.4. Game Chapter Three 
 
Objective: Can the participant theorise about their own mind and that of ‘Ashley’s’ 
simultaneously in order to select an answer response that is in line with both their 
personality traits? 
 
5.4.1. Theme One: Correct application of ToM 
 
5.4.1.1. Category One: Correct answer, correctly considers both perspectives 
This category has been perceived by the author to illustrate the answer 
responses that were correct and also demonstrate evidence of the participants 
theorising about both their own mind and ‘Ashley’s, based upon the selected 
personality traits.   
P01, Prompt B&C, Introverted & Gentle: “I am easy-going, reserved but quite 
understanding. ‘Ashley’ is calm and forgiving.” 
P03, Prompt A&B, Relaxed & Sceptical: “Because we have both got easy going, 
empathetic and understanding. I don't think they would be judgemental and talk 
immediately to the police” 
P08, A&C, Sensitive & Curious: “ Because it is still a relatively extroverted and 
autonomous way of acting upon it. In choosing to investigate as well as choosing 
to nor be mean about it”  
 
5.4.1.2. Category Two: Correct Answer, correctly considers one perspective 
This category has been perceived by the author to illustrate the answer 
responses that were correct and also demonstrates evidence of the participants 
theorising about only their own mind or ‘Ashley’s’, based upon the selected 
personality traits.   
P01, A&C, Relaxed & Sincere: “They haven't said the reason for not needing 
money, I would be reserved but still willing to help” 
P02, B&C,  Sensitive & Curious: “ A seems like compassionate and curious, B is 
too practical. C is practical and extroverted that's also an option. A is what I 
would do in real life, so I will choose that option. 
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P04, A&B, Disciplined & Sceptical: “If you commit to one line of action you get 
stuck. You would pick and option with fluidity in order to leave the door open to 
other possibilities. Maybe we could pick a weekly payback option” 
 
5.4.1.3. Category Three: Incorrect answer, correctly considers both perspectives 
This category has been perceived by the author to illustrate the answer 
responses that were incorrect, but demonstrates evidence of the participants 
correctly theorising about both their own mind or ‘Ashley’s’, based upon the 
selected personality traits.   
 
P06, A&B, Sceptical & Relaxed: “We are both sceptical and curious, so obviously 
we don't trust that out money will be paid back so it seems sensible for us to find 
information before we do something” 
P07, A&C, Disciplined & Sceptical: “We don't know the extent of the falling out. 
For example, is the flat mate a heavy drug user. I think it's important to be 
stressed about drama, but it is important to work it out by talking. I think it is in 
both our interests to assess the situation, then work out the best way to deal with 
it.”  
P08: A&C, Sincere & Relaxed: “I was trying to find a compromise between 
considering it still and at least being relatively sincere and honest, rather than just 
questioning how it is going to work” 
 
5.4.1.4. Category Four : Incorrect answer, correctly considers one perspective 
This category has been perceived by the author to illustrate the answer 
responses that were incorrect, but demonstrates evidence of the participants 
correctly theorising about only their own mind or ‘Ashley’s, based upon the 
selected personality traits.   
P08, A&B, Sincere & Disciplined: “Because it is in keeping with ‘Ashley’s’ 
personality trait. None are in keeping exactly and I thought the pragmatic choice 
was in keeping with the autonomous one, so it seemed a measurable option to 
pick” 
P06, A&B, Sceptical & Relaxed: “Because I think it is sensible to look first to see 
if there is a way of definitely getting in touch with the person. I wouldn't pick B 
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because I am too sceptical and wouldn't trust that the person is going to come 
back.” 
 
5.4.2. Theme Two: Incorrect or no evidence of application of ToM 
 
5.4.2.1. Category One: Correct answer, no evidence of ToM/ too easy 
This category has been perceived by the author to illustrate the answer 
responses that were correct, but the participant was selecting their answers 
based upon matching words as opposed to theorising about their own or Ashley’s 
intentions in relation to the selected personality traits.   
P02, Prompt A&C, Extroverted and Autonomous: “We are literally both 
extroverted and autonomous” 
P03, Prompt B&C, Sensitive & Curious: “Because you are both carefree and 
sensitive, curious and non-judgemental” 
P08, Prompt A&C, Extroverted & Autonomous: “The first one because it matches 
his extroverted and my autonomous personality traits” 
 
5.4.2.2. Category Two: Incorrect answer, incorrect intention 
This category has been perceived by the author to illustrate the answer 
responses that were incorrect and that the participants’ theorising about their own 
or Ashley’s intentions were not related to the selected personality traits.  
P01, Prompt A& B, Relaxed & Sceptical: “Because it is the most responsible 
thing to do. Honesty is the best policy” 
P02, A&B, Relaxed & Sceptical: “D is mostly curious, C is mostly compassionate. 
I am thinking about how to bridge the gap if there are two people” 
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5.5. Quantitative Summary 
 
Figure 3.  
Pie Chart of the percentage of answers responses per category in Game Chapter 
One
 
 
5.5.1. Game Chapter One 
Displayed in Figure 3 is a pie chart of the percentage of answer responses per 
category in Chapter One.  Within Theme One, “Correct application of ToM”: 36% 
of the answer responses were perceived to be in the “Correct Answer, correct 
Intention” category and 12% were in the “Incorrect Answer, Correct Intension” 
category. Within Theme Two, “Incorrect or no application of ToM”: 40% of the 
answer were perceived to be in “Correct answer, no ToM/too easy” category, 8% 
were in “Incorrect Answer, ambiguous intension” category and 4% of the answers 
were in “Incorrect Answer, incorrect Intension” category. The results suggest that 
there was a variety in methods taken by participants to answer the questions in 
this Chapter. The support this provides for the inclusion of a training Chapter will 
be explored in the discussion.  
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Figure 4.  
Pie chart of percentage of answers responses per category in Game Chapter 
Two 
 
 
5.5.2. Game Chapter Two 
Displayed in Figure 3 is a pie chart of the percentage of answer responses in 
each category in Chapter Two.  Within Theme One, “Correct application of ToM”: 
46% of the answer responses were perceived to be in the “Correct Answer, 
correct Intention” category and 17% were in the “Incorrect Answer, Correct 
Intension” category. Within Theme Two, “Incorrect or no application of ToM”: 17% 
of the answer responses were perceived to be in the “Correct answer, no 
ToM/too easy” category; 14% were in “Incorrect Answer, ambiguous intension” 
category and 6% of the answers were in “Incorrect Answer, incorrect Intension” 
category. The results suggest that there was a lot of variation in the methods 
given by the participants to how they responded to the questions. The reasoning 
for this will be explored in the discussion. 
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Figure 5.  
Pie Chart of percentage of answers per category in Game Chapter Three 
 
 
5.5.3. Game Chapter Three 
Displayed in Figure 4 is a pie chart of the percentage of answer responses per 
category in Chapter Two.  Within Theme One, “Correct application of ToM”: 29% 
of the answer responses were perceived to be in the “Correct answer, considers 
both perspectives” category; 17% of the answers were perceived to be in the 
“Correct answer, correctly considers one perspective” category; 15% of the 
answers were perceived to be in the “Incorrect answer, correctly considers both 
perspectives” category and 4% of the responses were in the “incorrect answer, 
correctly considers one perspective” category. Within Theme Two, “Incorrect or 
no application of ToM”: 33% of the answers were perceived to be in the “Correct 
answer, no ToM/too easy category and 2% of the answers were in the “Incorrect 
Answer, incorrect intension category”. The results suggests that there was a lot of 
variation in the methods given by the participants to how they responded to the 
questions. The reasoning for this will be explored in the discussion. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS 3  
 
 
6.1 Thematic Analysis 
 
This section continues to assess the face validity of TFG by using a co-
production methodology to explore the participants’ experience of playing the 
TFG. To do this, a Thematic Analysis (Braun & Clark, 2006) of participants’ 
responses to the four post-test questions was conducted and a thematic ‘map’ 
was produced. Although the answers to each question were considered 
independently, themes across the questions were identified. Accordingly, the 
themes have been discussed in terms of themes and subthemes.  
 
6.2. Overarching Themes 
 
Four overarching themes appeared within the coded data across the four post-
test questions. Within each theme there were two-three subthemes. Each 
overarching theme will be discussed and illustrated through the use of participant 
quotes. Table 10. displays the ‘map’ of the themes and subthemes that were 
perceived by the researcher.  
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Table 11.  
Themes perceived in the coded data across Questions One to Four. 
Theme Subtheme 
Engagement 
Enjoyable and engaging 
TFG was more challenging  
ToM Intervention 
TFG encourages social perspective taking 
TFG could be adapted for use as an intervention 
Ecological 
Validity 
Mathematic processing of TFG answers 
Complexity of social nuances  
Complexities of 
ASD experience 
Sensory Differences 
Social Camouflaging 
Social Learning 
 
 
6.2.1 Theme One: Engagement 
The participants spoke about TFG being an engaging measure of ToM that 
challenged them more than the previously established measures of ToM.   
 
6.2.1.1. Subtheme One: Enjoyable and stimulating 
P01 “There were scenarios you had to really think about the other person's 
needs” 
 
P03: “I think I would do it more easily if it was a questionnaire, it was way more 
difficult to combine both because there is more than one answer” 
 
P05: “I liked it, it slightly stretched me more than my day to day. It makes me 
think of the responses we both would give”  
 
6.2.1.2. Subtheme Two: TFG was challenging 
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P01: “TFH has more thought process involved […] you had to really think about 
the other person's needs. In the other one [SSQ] it was more about fact finding” 
 
P03: “I found TFG more playful and less pressured [than SSQ]” 
 
P05: “TFG was more interactive [than SSQ] as you are matching the roles of the 
two friends […] I found it enjoyable” 
 
P01: “There were scenarios where you really had to think about the other 
person’s needs” 
 
P04:” I found the stories and questions a lot easier, the facts were all there” 
 
P05: “The Friendship Game was more challenging that Social Stories” 
 
6.2.3. Theme Two: ToM Intervention 
Participants expressed that TFG challenged them to consider more than their 
own perspective when selecting an answer response to the social scenarios.  
Participants also discussed ideas around TFG being adapted and used as an 
intervention to support individuals with ASD with social interaction difficulties.  
 
6.2.3.1. Subtheme One: TFG encourages perspective taking 
P01: “You would normally think about yourself first, then the other's personality 
second. So thinking about it more, raises awareness” 
 
P04: “Whilst it was easier having it written down, in the real world I would 
struggle, I would probably just suggest what I would do” 
 
P05: “It definitely makes you think more of the friend and what your own 
responses will be, rather than thinking about the most obvious answer- what your 
own thought would be” 
 
P07: “Most of the time you are in your own little world. So thinking about other 
people’s needs puts that in to perspective” 
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6.2.3.2. Subtheme Two: TFG could be adapted for use as an intervention 
P07: “I liked that it encourages a conversation and that you get to talk” 
 
P04: “What would be helpful is to create an app. Then you have that to help you 
when making decisions of what to do “ 
 
P05: “ I wish me and my friends were on cards so I could be like 'see, you got my 
personality card wrong” 
 
P06: “It would be interesting to play the game as somebody else, instead of 
myself” 
 
6.2.4. Theme Three: Ecological Validity 
Participants discussed how answering the questions in TFG could be achieved 
through using a formulaic process, rather than a ToM approach. They also 
reflected on challenges with social interaction being more complex and nuanced 
in everyday life than what was depicted in TFG.  
 
6.2.4.1 Subtheme One: Mathematic processing of TFG answers  
P02: “I thought of it like a math’s equation, which made it a lot easier” 
 
P08: “ I found it difficult to stick within the boxes of my chosen traits” 
 
P02: “the friendship game was more like algebra” 
 
P08 : “I found it weird picking an answer based upon what I picked rather than 
what was instinctively my answer” 
 
P06: “The thing I find difficult is not matching a card, but finding out what their 
personality is in the first place” 
 
6.2.4.2. Subtheme Two: Complexity of Social Nuances 
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P03: “In different situations people are more one way than another [when 
decision making]. Some are more difficult [to decide upon] than others” 
 
P07: “It's the nuances when things get tricky. It's also the external state of the 
person. E.g. In the 'dropped the wallet' example If upset she would have less 
compassion that day. It's really difficult to measure that” 
 
P06: “It would be more nuanced in real life. For example, there definitely wouldn't 
be one right answer. It would depend on more than a few personality traits” 
 
6.2.5. Theme Four: Complexities of ASD experience 
Participants discussed their experiences of living with ASD, noting the particular 
challenges they experience with everyday social interaction. They also discussed 
the strategies they use to manage social interactions in daily life, such as 
observing and learning how individuals act in social environments and using 
social camouflaging techniques.  
 
6.2.5.1 Subtheme One: Sensory Differences 
P01: “I find that I do feel other people's emotions, but too strongly, it overwhelms 
me and I don't know what to do” 
 
P08: “I think normal people can be so emotionally reactive that they can easily 
get upset. So being able to detach emotionally can be really helpful” 
 
P02: “It is it hard for me to be in noisy group environments because I struggle to 
listen to what people are saying” 
 
P07: “I understand nuances, I just don't like getting caught up in them”  
 
6.2.5.2. Sub Theme Two: Social Camouflaging 
P03: “I find it easier to go along with things [in real life] I say yes. I don't expect 
people to compromise, I do want other people want or not engage at all” 
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P08: “Quite often I act in the way I think the person might like to be treated rather 
than being able to think how they might want me to be” 
 
P08: “I find that the people with Autism are sometimes more astute at picking our 
social emotions because of having to learn it to the point of overcompensating” 
 
6.2.5.3. Sub Theme Three: Social Learning 
P02: “ In real life you need to work out, what do you want and what can you offer. 
The personality traits would be more on a spectrum and they would dominate 
depending on the situation” 
 
P02: “Everyone comes with a rule book. To some people it is instinctive, for 
people with Autism, they have to consult the rule book more regularly” 
 
P07: “Having AS/HF ASD is like being in a submarine and having no computers. 
Everything is 100% manual” 
 
P08: “As I got older I learnt how to act around others. “I think that social learning 
is a major factor in developing social awareness” 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
 
 
The current study has developed a new measure of social cognition that 
addresses ToM in adults with a diagnosis of HF ASD. Building upon previous 
ToM research, TFG applies a game-like design to increase the engagement and 
complexity for use with adult and high-functioning presentations. The main 
findings of the research will be discussed throughout this chapter, including their 
clinical implications and limitations. There will be reference to previous research 
as well as the next steps required for the validation of TFG and the future 
development. Firstly, there will be a discussion of the individual case reviews. 
This will be followed by a discussion of the results of the content analysis and the 
implications this has for the scoring of TFG. Following this, the thematic analysis 
of the post-test questions will be considered in relation to the aims and objectives 
of the study.  
 
7.1. Individuals Case Reviews 
 
The individual case reviews informed the preliminary beta testing of TFG through 
providing an exploratory assessment of the validity of the new measure. The 
results of the cognitive tests, social cognitive tests and self-report measures will 
be discussed below.  
 
7.1.1. Cognitive Measures 
It was not observed that the participants’ performances on TFG were associated 
with or could be explained by their performances on the tests of general 
cognition. For example, the participant who scored the lowest on TFG also 
performed in the “Average” or better ranges on the Cognitive tests. Whilst there 
was some indication that the participants’ scores on the mood measures were 
sufficiently severe as to influence their test performances, it was not observed to 
affect their performances on the day of testing. Overall, the individual case 
reviews of the cognitive test data suggest that performance on TFG was not 
influenced by underlying cognitive difficulties, thus providing initial support of the 
independence of the measure (Prince et al., 2003).  
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7.2.2. Social Cognitive Measures  
All participants’ performances on the SSQ (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999) scored 
in the “Average” range or above. These findings suggest that no participants had 
difficulty completing this measure, which is not in line with previous research 
findings with the HF ASD population (Pedreno et al., 2017; Scheeren et al., 2013; 
Zalla et al., 2009). On the WACS-AF, all but one participant performed in the 
“Average” range and above, which is not in line with previous research findings 
with the HF ASD population (Holdnack, Goldstein, & Drozdick, 2011). Overall, the 
participants’ individual performances on the existing tests of social cognition only 
demonstrated minimal levels of impairment.  
 
All participants’ scores on the Cognitive Empathy subscale of the QCAE were in 
the “Average” range or below and six of the participants scored in the “Below 
range or below. This suggests that most of the participants have some difficult 
with cognitive empathy skills. In line with previous research (Rueda, Fernández-
Berrocal, & Baron-Cohen, 2015), most participants scored higher on the Affective 
Empathy subscale; three participants scored in the ‘Impaired” to “Below Normal” 
ranges, whilst five participants scored in the “Low Average” range and above. All 
participants had a diagnosis of ASD, five out of six of the participants showed 
significant difficulties with social skills, with a score in the ‘Below Normal’ or 
‘Impaired’ ranges (Woodbury-Smith et al, 2005; Hurst, et al, 2007).  
 
When exploring the convergent validity of TFG (Prince et al., 2003), the results 
on the existing social cognitive tests suggest that there would be no difference in 
performance on TFG in comparison to matched typically developing controls. 
However, most of the participants’ individual scores on the QCAE evidence 
“Below Normal” scores in Cognitive Empathy. Overall the majority participants’ 
self-reported difficulties were relatively mild in comparison to the wider ASD 
population, however, the relative strengths and difficulties from the sub-tests are 
in keeping with the ASD diagnostic criteria (APA, 2015). Accordingly, this offers 
some evidence to suggest that errors made in TFG could still be explained by a 
deficit in social cognition. If this were the case, it would suggest that the design of 
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TFG is more challenging for adults with HF ASD presentations, in comparison to 
existing measures of social cognition.   
 
7.2.3. Education and Mood 
All but two of the participants completed between three and ten years of further 
education, which is above average for the general population (National Master, 
2020). The results indicate that most of the participants are representative of the 
very high functioning end of the ASD spectrum in regards to intellectual abilities 
and independence. However, this did not appear to impact upon their Cognitive 
test performance. Similarly, this does not minimise the impact on participant’s 
ASD symptoms upon their everyday lives (Mazurek, 2014; Trembath, Germano, 
Johanson, & Dissanayake, 2012). For example, six out of the eight participants 
scored moderate to moderately severe levels of anxiety and/or depression on the 
GAD-7 and PHQ-9. As noted earlier, mood has a bi-directional interaction with 
ASD symptoms, which in turn impacts upon their severity. As such, caution 
should be applied to the interpretation of the results.  
 
7.3. Content Analysis 
 
The participants’ individual performances on the TFG varied, with participants 
making between one and eleven errors. Some participants made more errors 
when considering ‘Ashley’s’ perspective, others more when considering their own 
perspective. This finding is in line with previous Autism research indicating that 
individuals with ASD have difficulty theorising about their own mind as well as 
that of others (David et al., 2010; Mitchell & O'Keefe, 2008). The content analysis 
informed the preliminary beta testing stage of TFG through reviewing the content 
and face validity of the participants’ verbal answer responses. It also continued to 
assess the feasibility of the measure through reviewing the test items for floor 
and ceiling effects. The following section will discuss the key findings from each 
chapter of TFG.  
 
7.3.1. Game Chapter One  
The objective of Chapter One was to familiarise the participants with how to give 
an answer response that was in line with their own or ‘Ashley’s’ personality trait. 
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The results from the content analysis revealed that the greatest proportion of 
answer responses were in the ‘no ToM/Too easy’ category or the ‘correct answer 
correct response’ category. These findings indicate that most participants 
understood how to give the correct response by the end of the chapter. Frequent 
responses falling into the categories: ‘Incorrect Answer, Correct Intention’, 
‘Correct Answer, ambiguous intention’ and ‘Incorrect answer, incorrect intention’, 
also provide evidence for there being some difficulty experienced by the 
participants during this chapter, suggesting that this chapter was not limited by 
floor or ceiling effects.  
 
7.3.2. Game Chapter Two   
The objective of Chapter Two was to see whether the participant could theorise 
about their own mind and that of ‘Ashley’s’ in order to select an answer response 
that is in line with their own or ‘Ashley’s’ personality trait.  The largest proportion 
of answers were in the ‘correct answer and correct response’ category.  This 
supports the construct validity (Prince et al., 2003) of the measure through 
demonstrating evidence of TFG requiring ToM skills to reach a decision. 
However, this also provides further evidence against the ToM model of ASD, 
through confirming that adults with a diagnosis of HF ASD can theorise about 
their own mind and that of Ashley’s (in line with Happé’s early criticisms of the 
false-belief tests).  
 
A large minority of the participants’ responses were items in the ‘incorrect 
answer, correct intention category’. This suggests that questions in Chapter Two 
may give rise to some false negatives. There are a number of potential 
explanations for why this may have happened. For example, there may have 
been a flaw in the wording of the answer responses leading to there not being a 
clear enough differentiation between the personality traits. Another explanation 
may be that some participants are able to apply ToM skills when explicitly asked 
to explain their thinking, but make more errors when providing more 
spontaneous, implicit answers using the game’s ‘A’, ‘B’,’C’ or ‘D’ counters. This 
explanation is in line with previous research suggesting that individuals with ASD 
make more implicit ToM errors than explicit ToM errors (Schneider et al., 2013; 
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Schuwerk et al., 2015; Senju et al., 2009; Sommer et al., 2018; Torralva et al., 
2013).  
 
Seventeen percent of the answer responses were in the category ‘Correct 
Answer, too easy, no ToM’. This suggests that the questions in Chapter Two may 
have also given rise to false positives (Prince et al., 2003). Some participants 
may have adopted a systematic method of matching the language in the answer 
responses to the personality traits, as opposed to theorising about their own mind 
or that of another. This approach to answering the question is supported by 
Hermalin and O’Conner’s (1985) research suggesting that individuals with Autism 
overcome difficulties in processing emotions through using a cognitive or ‘logico-
affective’ approach, rather than being guided by their emotions or employing a 
auto-affective approach. This approach to answering may have inadvertently 
been reinforced by the use of the trait prompts in Chapter One; participants may 
have learnt to match language as opposed to theorise about their interpersonal 
responses to the situation.  
 
There being frequent responses coded under the categories: ‘Correct Answer, 
ambiguous intention’ and ‘Incorrect answer, incorrect intention’, also provide 
evidence for there being some difficulty experienced by the participants with the 
application of ToM during this chapter.  
 
7.3.3. Game Chapter Three 
The objective of Chapter Three was to see whether the participants could 
consider both their own and ‘Ashley’s’ personality traits in order to reach a 
compromise on an answer response to a social scenario. In this chapter, the 
largest percentages of answers were in the ‘correct answer, no ToM/too easy’ 
category. Similar to Chapter Two, there are number of explanations for why this 
might have been; such as participants adopting a logico-affective method of 
responding as opposed to an auto-affective method (Hermelin & O’Connor, 
1985). Fifteen percent of the answers also belonged to the  ‘Incorrect answer, 
correct application of ToM’ category. Similar to Chapter Two there are a number 
of explanations for why this might have been. For example, participants may 
make more errors when answering questions using a spontaneous and implicit 
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response as opposed to a more carefully reasoned, explicit response (Schneider 
et al., 2013; Schuwerk et al., 2015; Senju et al., 2009; Sommer et al., 2018; 
Torralva et al., 2013).  
 
Seventeen percent of the answers were in the category ‘correct answer, but only 
considering one perspective’. The quotes allocated to this category suggest that 
some participants felt more comfortable choosing an answer based upon what 
they would do in that situation, rather than also considering how ‘Ashley’ would 
act. This provides evidence that theorising about more than their own perspective 
simultaneously was too challenging for a number of participants, consistent with a 
ToM model of ASD, and in line with the ASD feature of demonstrating difficulties 
in social-emotional reciprocity and adjusting behaviour to suit different social 
situations (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Other participants gave 
answers that only considered ‘Ashley’s’ perspective, without also reflecting on 
what would make them happy. This pattern of responding suggests some 
participants are not aware of, or ignored their own needs in order to fit in with 
what others would like to do. This is in line with research demonstrating that 
individuals with ASD socially camouflage to meet the demands and complexity of 
social interaction (Dean et al., 2017). 
 
7.3 Thematic Analysis  
 
The themes identified from the analysis will inform the beta testing of TFG by 
extending the exploration of the face and content validity. In particular, 
addressing the objective of developing an ecologically valid and engaging 
measure of ToM, that is challenging enough for an adult HF ASD population.  
The themed responses also provide a preliminary indicator of TFG’s predictive 
validity, through considering how the participants’ experience of playing the TFG 
compares to their real life experiences of establishing new friendships. As 
previously discussed, the development and testing of TFG has been informed by 
a co-production approach (Gibbons et al., 1994). Accordingly, the participants’ 
responses to TFG are valued as a key contribution to the future shaping and 
development of TFG.  
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7.3.1. Theme One: Engagement 
The responses suggest that TFG was received by many of the participants as 
being an engaging measure of ToM that prompted them to consider their own 
and Ashley’s perspectives when deciding upon an answer. It was also noted that 
many of the participants considered TFG to be more challenging than the other 
measures of social cognition used in the study. This suggests that TFG may have 
addressed some criticisms of ToM measures; that individuals with HF ASD could 
pass these tests and thus were not challenging or engaging enough (Curry & 
Jones-Chesters, 2012; Green et al., 2000).  
 
7.3.2. Theme Two: ToM Intervention 
The quotes within this theme suggest that TFG may be a useful tool to promote 
social skills for adults with HF ASD who experience trouble with interpersonal 
interaction and communication. For example, a number of participants expressed 
that the personality traits and the selection of answer responses helped to 
scaffold their thinking around including both their own and ‘Ashley’s’ perspective 
when selecting an answer. This is in line with Senju et al.’s (2009) study, which 
found the participant’s implicit ToM performance improved when a pre-test 
learning condition was added. It also shows support for TFG’s use of a game-like 
design, due to its ability to offer psychoeducation about ToM and how it relates to 
everyday social scenarios (Higgins et al., 1982; Mehta et al., 1994a, 1994b). One 
participant stated that the design of TFG helped to prompt a discussion, which in 
turn helped them to identify the ToM aspects of the TFG that they found 
challenging. This suggests that using an intervention tool, with a similar design to 
TFG, may help to scaffold social skills training (Sanders & Welk, 2005; Vygotsky, 
1967). If effective, this may have significant impact, including for example, 
reducing loneliness (Mazurek, 2014) and unemployment (Krieger, Kinebanian, 
Prodinger, & Heigl, 2012; The National Autistic Society, 2019) in the adult HD 
ASD population.   
 
 A number of participants also suggested ideas for how TFG could be adapted 
into a tool for support with social skills. For example, one participant suggested 
that TFG could be developed into an app for a PC or Mobile Phone. This in turn 
could support adults with HF ASD to recognise other people’s personality traits, 
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with the goal of making social interaction more predictable. Another participant 
suggested that TFG could be adapted to support the communication in already 
established relationships.  For example, instead of playing themselves, they 
could play someone they knew. As an intervention, this could help two people to 
identify why they theorise about decisions in separate ways, which in turn could 
help them to reach a compromise on a difficult decision in everyday life.  
 
7.3.3. Theme Three: Ecological Validity 
Many of the participants’ vocalised that their experience of social interaction and 
building new friendships is a lot more complex in real life than in the scenarios 
depicted in TFG. Some participants felt that answering the questions in TFG 
could be approached in a similar way to completing an algebra problem. These 
reflections suggest that participants may have been answering the questions 
using a logico-affective approach (Hermelin & O’Connor, 1985), which might 
explain why many participants gave simple, formulaic answers, as opposed to 
reasoning emotionally about why a decision was made. A number of participants 
also reflected that it was difficult to make decisions based upon just one of their 
selected personality traits. They explained that every day decisions are based 
upon more than one personality trait and are complicated further by elements 
such as mood and social setting.  
 
Whilst the game-like structure of TFG strived to improve the real-life applicability 
of TFG (through incorporating a dynamic interaction with the researcher) the 
ecological validity of TFG was restricted through the need to standardise the 
testing conditions across participants and settings (Prince et al., 2003). 
Nonetheless, it is important to consider how elements of the game could be 
adapted to include more social interaction variants. For example, future adaptions 
of TFG may include chapters with additional personality and mood variants in 
order to increase the degree of social nuance.  
 
7.3.4. Theme Four: Complexities of ASD Experience 
The answer responses within this theme reflected the participants’ experience of 
living with HF ASD and explored some of their personal challenges with social 
interaction and communication. Some participants stated that their social 
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interaction difficulties are further complicated by sensory difficulties, such as 
feeling sensitive to noise or experiencing physical sensations to other people’s 
emotions.  These reflections suggest that a full understanding of ASD encompass 
a wider set of issues than ToM.   
 
Participants reported that they needed to spend a lot of time observing and 
learning how to interact socially. One person expressed that social interaction 
was instinctive to typically developing people, but individuals with ASD need to 
spend years learning how to socially interact via trial and error. This coheres with 
the point made earlier that offering a pre-test learning condition on implicit ToM 
tests can improve ToM performance in adults with HF ASD (Senju et al., 2009). 
Participants described this experience as being similar to needing to regularly 
consult a manual. This reflection suggests that some participants in the study feel 
more socially confident where social interactions are more familiar and 
predictable (For example: long-term relationships or long-term employment).  
 
A number of participants expressed that they often go along with what others say, 
or otherwise feel as if they are over-compensating, which is in line with social 
camouflaging research (Dean et al., 2017). This was also noted when some 
participants only considered ‘Ashley’s’ perspective and overlooked their own 
position when making a collective decision in the Game Chapter Three.  
 
7.4. Methodological Limitations 
 
The methodology of the current study was limited by a number of factors that 
have been discussed throughout the thesis. Most prominently, the conclusions 
that could be drawn from the preliminary alpha and beta testing were limited by a 
small sample size and not including a matched typically developing control 
sample.    
 
All participants were recruited via online social media platforms and word of 
mouth. Recruiting participants via these methods increases the likelihood of 
sampling bias (Prince et al., 2003) through only recruiting participants who were 
willing to participate. This may also provide an explanation for why all but one of 
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the participants scored in the ‘borderline’ severity range on the AQ measure 
(Woodbury-Smith, 2005), and why the majority of the participants had an above 
UK average number of years in education (National Master, 2020). In turn, this 
may have resulted in the participants gaining a higher score on the measures of 
social cognition and TFG in comparison to the wider HF ASD population. 
Furthermore, it may have also impacted upon the verbal responses given in TFG. 
The current study was also limited through not taking account of the age of 
diagnosis and/or prior interventions. Taking note of these items would have 
provided further information regarding the individual severity of the ASD 
presentation.  
 
The qualitative methods used in this study offer new insights into how the ToM 
model of ASD relates to difficulties in social interaction and communication for the 
participants in this study. However, the qualitative methodology has been 
criticised for its lack of rigor in assessing its validity in comparison to quantitative 
methods (Yardley, 2000). In response to this, Yardley (2000) set out criteria by 
which qualitative researchers can assess the validity of their research.  
 
The first criteria is sensitivity to context. Part of this process was being aware of 
how the theories underpinning the feedback process may influence the 
researchers’ interpretation of the participants reflections; for example, the ToM 
model of ASD. Another part of this process was the importance of the 
researchers’ reflexivity about the surrounding social context. For example, the 
researcher acknowledging their presence as a ‘neurotypical’ and how this might 
be experienced by an individual with a diagnosis of HF ASD. A further 
consideration and potential limitation of the study was the shift in power dynamic 
from the researcher adopting an ‘expert’ position when conducting the Cognitive 
and Social Cognitive tests, to adopting a ‘neutral’ position when exploring their 
feedback afterwards. The reseracher used a diary to support their sensitivity to 
context, an excerpt can be found in Appendix 14.   
 
The second criteria is Commitment and Rigour. This describes the extent to 
which the research underwent a thorough and meticulous process of data 
analysis. One potential limitation of this process was the use of documenting the 
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participants’ feedback by hand. This method was chosen in order to minimise the 
already quite lengthy testing process. Whilst the responses were short enough for 
this to be achieved, it may have given rise to transcribing errors which would 
have been avoided if their feedback was electronically recorded. In addition to 
this, the relatively small participant number limited amont of the data available for 
analysis and reflective interpretation. However, the analysis of the reserach 
underwent several processes of contemplation before the final themes were 
agreed upon. There was also a process of triangulation whereby the academic 
supervisior independently reviewed the quotes to agree upon the final selection 
of themes.  
 
The third criteria is Coherence and Transparency. This is the extent to which the 
story told from the data adequately reflects the participants’ experience of playing 
TFG and thus convinces the reader of its success and key areas for 
improvement. The criteria is also line with the underlying philosophical positioning 
(please see theoretical limitations for a discussion).  The transparency of the 
study also referes to the the extent to which the reseracher adopted a reflexive 
approach to considering the influences and motivations for conducting the 
research, as well as the external pressures that influenced the study. An exerpt of 
the reserachers personal reflections can be found in Appendix 15.  
 
The forth criteria is Impact and Importance. As discussed above, and within the 
next section on the ‘future developments’, the participant feedback was a highly 
valued and core part of the TFG’s development. Their reflections also reached 
beyond the TFG’s development to consider how a measure of ToM only reflects a 
limited aspect of the HF ASD experience. Their views also offered a core ethical 
critique of the value placed on developing a somewhat reductive measure of their 
experience rather than focusing on the development of tools and interventions to 
support individuals with HF ASD. These reflections also highlight the limits of 
conducting research within the confines of a doctoral thesis, in that time and 
resource restrictions limit the ambitions of the research. 
 
7.5. Theoretical Limitations 
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As discussed earlier, this approach taken to develop and validate TFG is 
consistent with the underlying critical realist philosophical position (Lopez & 
Potter, 2005). This has firstly been achieved through acknowledging that ToM 
exists as a measurable construct, and developing and validating a new tool that 
seeks to measure it. It also acknowledges that ToM is a recent and contested 
construct and is, therefore, limited by bias and subjectivity. The qualitative 
analysis therefore helped to interrogate and contextualise the notion of ToM. The 
co-production approach (Gibbons et al., 1994) also helped to ensure the design 
of the new measure is shaped by and relevent to adults with HF ASD. Whilst 
adults with HF ASD’s feedback helped to inform the design throughout, the extent 
to which TFG was ‘co-produced’ was limited by the researcher making the 
ultimate decisions (Filipe, Renedo, & Marston, 2017).  
 
Although the ToM model of ASD has received mixed findings over the past 
decades, it dominates the ASD research field. Choosing to develop the TFG 
based upon the ToM construct creates a problem of circularity; that the more a 
construct is researched, the more evidence is produced in support of it, which in 
turn makes it more likely for the study findings to be replicated. Adding to this 
challenge is the problem of validation. As discussed earlier, establishing the 
convergent validity of a measure is achieved through comparing it with a ‘gold 
standard’ measure (Prince et al., 2003). Due to ToM tests such as SSQ, RMET 
and FPT being the most researched measures of social cognition in the adult HF 
ASD population, they are frequently used to assess the convergent validity of 
new measures. This subsequently makes it difficult for newly developed and less 
established tests of social cognition to exert an influence on the literature (Everett 
& Earp, 2015; Schmidt & Oh, 2016; Shrout & Rodgers, 2018), which then 
decreases the likelihood of the study reaching ‘gold standard’ status.  
 
7.6. Future Research Directions 
 
In line with the Prince et al., (2003) guidelines, the next stage of instrument 
testing would require the recruitment of fifty to 100 participants. The data would 
then be used to assess the test-retest reliability, ceiling and floor effects and 
internal scale consistency of TFG. After any further changes to the TFG were 
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made, a different sample of participants would be recruited to inform the next 
stage of test development. The same comparison studies would be used in the 
main beta testing of TFG to assess the criterion and concurrent validity of TFG. 
Correlational analyses of the results would then generate information about 
TFG’s validity coefficients, sensitivity, specificity, and positive and negative 
predictive value. During this process, the internal consistency of TFG would be 
re-examined and a factor analysis would be conducted to see whether the 
individual questions and chapters of TFG measure the same underlying ToM 
construct.  
 
The ability of TFG to measure ToM ability would then be assessed through 
comparing the performances of the adult HF ASD group with a matched typically 
developing control group. A power analysis would be conducted to inform the 
number of participants required to perform a parametric statistical analyses 
(Field, 2013). A large and reliable difference found between the two groups would 
therefore offer support for the ToM instrument. The predictive validity of the 
measure would also be assessed. This might be achieved through observing 
whether TFG could predict self-reported ToM errors in everyday social interaction 
of the adult HF ASD participants. Finally, external investigators who are not part 
of TFG development team would independently assess the content validity of 
TFG before it could be considered a fully validated measure of ToM.   
 
Once (and if) validated, it would be important to test the TFG using a varied 
participant sample, for example, with adult HF ASD participants from a non-
western culture. The social scenarios depicted in TFG are likely limited by being 
developed from a western perspective and seeking to measure the ToM 
construct, which has been largely researched within a western context (Joseph, 
Reddy, & Searle-Chatterjee, 1990; Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & Sabbagh, 2008). 
Subsequently, the scenarios may need to be adapted for use in different cultures, 
to reflect the different cross-cultural nuances in ToM and social interaction (Liu et 
al., 2008). It would also be important to test the TFG on alternative clinical 
populations who have acquired brain injuries and thus present with impairments 
in social interaction and communication abilities (Henry, Phillips, Crawford, 
Ietswaart, & Summers, 2006; Lezak et al., 2004). Comparing ToM performances 
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to a different clinical population would help infer whether the test was predictive 
of a specific ASD related ToM deficit, or whether it measures ToM difficulties 
across different clinical presentations.  
 
One of the objectives of the TFG development and testing was also to gain 
information regarding its use as a social intervention. It was important that ideas 
for this were generated via a co-production approach. As highlighted in the 
thematic analysis, a number of participants believed that TFG has the potential to 
support adults with HF ASD with social interaction skills. It will be useful for future 
developments of TFG to also explore its potential as an intervention. For 
example, through developing a mobile app to help practice social skills with 
different personalities in different social settings that offers constructive feedback. 
This approach may also provide more flexibility for age and cultural differences 
within the HS adult ASD population.  
 
7.7. Conclusion 
 
This study introduced a framework of how to conduct an exploratory validation 
study, which draws upon a co-production approach, to shape and inform the 
development of a new measure of ToM. The research findings give initial support 
for the content, construct and predictive validity of TFG. Participant feedback also 
indicates that the game-like design of TFG was engaging and more complex than 
previous measures of social cognition. TFG encouraged participants to reflect 
upon their personal difficulties with social interaction and communication, thus 
demonstrating the measure’s potential as a social intervention. However, despite 
the early successes of the research, it was limited by a number of methodological 
and theoretical considerations. The ambition for the next steps of this research 
will be to disseminate the study findings through a publication and conference 
presentations. On a smaller level, the thesis will be shared with the participants of 
the study with the opportunity for them to feedback their reflections. It is hoped is 
that this bottom-up process of dissemination will also lead to further presentation 
opportunities.    
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Appendix 1: Final Version of The Friendship Game 
 
The Friendship Game 
 
1. Overview and Personality Cards 
 
Place the card decks and personality chart before examinee. 
SAY: “We will now be playing a game. It is about new friendships.  The aim of the 
game is to earn as many friendship points as you can.  For the purpose of this 
game, I will be playing as a character called ‘Ashley’ and you will be playing 
yourself [‘participant name’].  You will be trying to develop a friendship with 
Ashley.  To earn friendship points, you will be answering questions about what 
you or Ashley would do in certain situations.  The questions are written on the 
cards in front of you.  The better choices you make, the faster you will make 
friends, and the more friendship points you will earn.” 
 
“Your character [participant name] will be based on your personality.  By 
personality, we mean the way we approach the world, deal with other people, and 
feel about ourselves.  I will make up a personality for Ashley.  To start then, you 
must select three personality traits, from the choices I will give you, that you feel 
best describe you.  After you have selected your traits, I will select the traits that 
best describe Ashley.” 
 
1.1.  Set A  Present first set of cards: Sincere A1;  Sceptical A2;  Disciplined 
A3;  Relaxed A4 
SAY: “Let’s begin.  Which one of these do you feel best describes you and your 
personality? If you have any questions about what the words mean, just ask me.” 
 
Allow examinee time to review options and make their selection.  When ready 
SAY: “That’s great. I will place the card here  [place card in front of examinee] so 
that you remember it.” 
 
Consult Table below and identify corresponding trait for Ashley character.  Pick 
up trait card and show to examinee.  SAY: “I would say that this card best 
describes Ashley.”   Place card in front of examiner. 
 
 
1.2.  Set B  Present next set of cards: Sensitive B1;  Strict B2;  Curious B3;  
Pragmatic B4 
SAY:  “Which one of these do you feel best describes you and your personality? 
Ask me if you have any questions about the words.” 
 
Allow examinee time to review options and make their selection.  When ready 
SAY:  “That’s great. I will place the card here  [place card next to other card]  so 
that you remember it.” 
 
Consult Table and identify corresponding trait for Ashley character.  Pick up trait 
card and show to examinee. 
SAY: “I would say that this card best describes Ashley.”  [Place card in front of 
examiner.] 
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1.3.  Set C  Present next set of cards: Extroverted C1;  Introverted C2;  Gentle 
C3;  Autonomous C4 
SAY:  “Now, which one of these do you feel best describes you and your 
personality? Ask me if you have any questions about the words.” 
 
Allow examinee time to review options and make their selection.  When ready 
SAY:  “That’s great. I will place the card here  [place card next to other cards] so 
that you remember it.” 
 
Consult Table and identify corresponding trait for Ashley character.  Pick up trait 
card and show to examinee. 
SAY: “I would say that this card best describes Ashley.”  [Place card in front of 
examiner.] 
 
 
Table:  Corresponding Personality Traits 
Set A Set B Set C 
If [participant] = A1, 
Ashley = A1 
If [participant] = B1, 
Ashley = B3 
If [participant] = C1, 
Ashley = C4 
If [participant] = A2, 
Ashley = A2 
If [participant] = B2, 
Ashley = B4 
If [participant] = C2, 
Ashley = C3 
If [participant] = A3, 
Ashley = A3 
If [participant] = B3, 
Ashley = B1 
If [participant] = C3, 
Ashley = C2 
If [participant] = A4, 
Ashley = A4 
If [participant] = B4, 
Ashley = B2 
If [participant] = C4, 
Ashley = C1 
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2. Training & Chapter 1 
 
SAY:  “So, you have now set out your personality and I have described Ashley’s 
personality.  You must make choices that will suit your personality and fit well 
with Ashley’s personality.  Let’s start the game by practicing doing this.  The 
friendship game will go through three Chapters.  In this first Chapter 1, you and 
Ashley will get to know one another by asking and answering some questions.  
Try to make sure that your answers match the personality traits you selected, as 
this will help you and Ashley get to know one another.  Let’s begin.” 
 
 
2.1.  Present Card 1 and SAY: “Here is the first situation.  This is about what 
Ashley would do, based on their personality.  You say to Ashley: ‘Ashley, it must 
be your birthday soon, how are you planning to celebrate it?’ 
 
Now, look at these options [point to response options and allow examinee a few 
moments to read]. 
So, based on Ashley’s Set A personality traits [point to personality cards set out 
in front of examiner], which one of these answers A, B, C, or D do you think 
Ashley would give?” 
A  Sceptical:  I doubt anyone will want to do anything; it is just another birthday. 
B  Disciplined:  I need to save money to go on a holiday, so I will have nice a 
dinner at home. 
C  Sincere:  I will host a small gathering and tell people in advance so they can 
come if they like. 
D  Relaxed:  I do not mind; I’ll sort it out nearer the time. 
 
Once recorded, note whether correct.  A correct response will correspond to the 
selected Set A trait. 
• If correct SAY: “Great; yes, as Ashley is [name the personality trait] this is 
their most likely response.” 
• If incorrect (any other option chosen) SAY: “That’s not quite right. As Ashley is 
[name the personality trait] this [point to response on card corresponding to 
that personality trait] is their most likely response in this situation.  Do you 
see?”   Repeat instructions above and provide further direction as necessary. 
 
 
2.2.  Present Card 2 and SAY:  “Here is the next situation.  This is about what 
you would do, based on your personality.  Ashley says to you ‘I was thinking 
about getting a Tattoo with my friend’s name on it. Do you think I should go for 
it?’ 
 
Now look at these options [point to response options and allow examinee a few 
moments to read]. 
So, based on your Set B personality trait  [point to personality cards set out in 
front of examinee], which one of these answers A, B, C or D should you give?” 
A  Sensitive:   What a lovely idea, how thoughtful. 
B  Strict:   I am not sure whether I would forgive you if you get a tattoo. 
C  Curious:   How interesting! How big will it be? 
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D  Pragmatic:   Be careful that you don’t regret it;  maybe you should draw it on 
your arm first? 
 
Once recorded, note whether correct.  A correct response will correspond to the 
selected Set B trait. 
• If correct SAY:  “Great; yes, as you say you are [name trait] this is the best 
thing for you to do.” 
• If incorrect (any other option chosen) SAY: “That’s not quite right. As you say 
you are [name trait] this [point to response on card corresponding to that 
personality trait] is the answer that suit you best in this situation.  Do you 
see?”  Repeat instructions above and provide further direction as necessary. 
 
 
2.3.  Present Card 3 and SAY:  “Here is the next situation.  This one is about 
what Ashley would do.  You say to Ashley: ‘Ashley, what’s your idea of a perfect 
Friday night?’ 
 
Look at the options and tell me, based on Ashley’s Set C personality trait [point to 
personality cards set out in front of examiner], which one of these answers do 
you think Ashley would give?” 
A  Extroversion:  I like getting in touch with lots of people and socialising into the 
night! 
B  Introversion:   I prefer to have a quiet night in. 
C  Gentle:   I see what other people would like to do and we agree a plan 
together. 
D  Autonomous:  I prefer to do something on my own, in my own time. 
 
Once recorded, note whether correct.  A correct response will correspond to the 
selected Set A trait. 
• If correct SAY: “Great; yes, as Ashley is [name the personality trait] this is 
their most likely response.” 
• If incorrect (any other option chosen) SAY: “That’s not quite right. As Ashley is 
[name the personality trait] this [point to response on card corresponding to 
that personality trait] is their most likely response in this situation.  Do you 
see?”   Repeat instructions above and provide further direction as necessary. 
 
3. Chapter 2 
 
SAY:  “Good.  So, we have learned a bit about how the game works; about 
Ashley’s personality, and how to give answers that will reflect your own 
personality.  Let’s go on to Chapter 2.  In Chapter 2, you and Ashley will be 
putting your friendship to the test. You will be presented with a number of 
situations, to respond to, based on your own personality.  And in these situations, 
you will need to demonstrate your knowledge of Ashley’s personality.  Ready?  
Let’s begin.” 
 
 
3.1.  Present Card 4 and SAY: “Here is the first situation.  This one is about what 
you would do.  Ashley says to you: ‘I need to go to a bank meeting to organise 
my finances; how prepared do you think I should I be?’ 
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Ashley, now knowing a bit about your personality will now guess what you are 
going to do’ 
 
Look at these options [point to response options and allow examinee a few 
moments to read] and tell me, based on your Set A personality trait [point to 
personality cards], which of these answers should you give?  
 
When you have made your decision, please place counter A, B, C or D on the 
table face down” 
 
The options below will be presented to the participant on a card without the 
personality trait labels  
 
A  Disciplined:   Let’s plan a time to meet and organise what forms to bring. 
B  Relaxed:   Take it easy! Just show up, I’m sure it’ll be fine. 
C  Sceptical:   I wouldn’t trust banks if I were you. 
D  Sincere:   To be honest, I think you should contact the bank to see what they 
recommend. 
 
 
I will play for Ashley, and will have a guess on what you will do based upon your 
Set A personality trait.”  Place an answer counter in position. 
 
When ready SAY:  “Once yours and Ashley’s counters are in the middle of the 
table faced down, you can turn them over to reveal your answers.” 
 
SAY: “Why did you think answer X was in line with your set A personality trait?” 
 
 
3.2.  Present Card 5 and SAY:  “This one is about what Ashley would do.  You 
say to Ashley: ‘If you saw a person fall over and hurt themselves when leaving 
here today, what would you do?’  
 
Based on Ashley’s Set B personality trait [point to personality cards], which one 
of these answers A, B, C or D do you think that Ashley would give?  
 
When you have made your decision, please place counter A, B, C or D on the 
table face down” 
 
The options below will be presented to the participant on a card without the 
personality trait labels  
 
A  Sensitive:  I would be concerned that they are OK; and worry that I wouldn’t 
be able to help them. 
B  Strict:  I am on a strict schedule, so I would need head straight home. 
C  Curious:  I would wonder what had happened and try to find something to 
create a bandage. 
D  Pragmatic:  I would first check for danger, then follow safety procedures to 
see if they were ok. 
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I will play for Ashley.  Which answer does Ashley give based upon their Set B 
personality trait?” 
Place an answer counter in position. 
 
When ready SAY:  “Once yours and Ashley’s counters are in the middle of the 
table faced down, you can turn them over to reveal your answers.” 
 
“Why did you think answer X was in line with Ashley’s set B personality trait?” 
 
 
3.3.  Present Card 6 and SAY: “This one is about what you would do.  Ashley 
says to you: ‘I need to buy some new clothes, where do you recommend I go?’  
 
Ashley, now knowing a bit about your personality will now guess what you are 
going to do’ 
 
Look at these options [point to response options and allow examinee a few 
moments to read] and tell me, based on your Set C personality trait [point to 
personality cards], which of these answers should you give? 
 
When you have made your decision, please place counter A, B, C or D on the 
table face down” 
 
The options below will be presented to the participant on a card without the 
personality trait labels  
 
A  Introverted:  I recommend you shop online; you avoid the crowds and enjoy 
the quiet of home. 
B  Extroverted:  Go to a big shopping mall where you can socialise and enjoy 
the hustle and bustle! 
C  Gentle:  Where do you normally like to shop? That way I can think about what 
you would like. 
D  Autonomous:  You should go to a department store alone, that way you can 
take as long as you like. 
 
I will play for Ashley, and will have a guess on what you will do based upon your 
Set C personality trait.”  Place an answer counter in position. 
 
When ready SAY:  “Once yours and Ashley’s counters are in the middle of the 
table faced down, you can turn them over to reveal your answers.” 
 
SAY: “Why did you think answer X was in line with your set C personality trait?” 
 
 
3.4. Present Card 7 and SAY: “This one is about what Ashley would do. You say 
to Ashley:  ‘Ashley, I really want to get in shape, but I don’t think I can afford the 
gym.  Do you have any ideas of what else I could do?’ 
 
151 
 
Look at these options [point to response options and allow examinee a few 
moments to read] and tell me, based on Ashley’s Set A personality trait [point to 
personality cards], which of these answers A, B , C, or D would Ashley give? 
 
When you have made your decision, please place counter A, B, C or D on the 
table face down” 
 
The options below will be presented to the participant on a card without the 
personality trait labels  
  
A Sincere:   To be fair, it is important to be healthy; can you do exercises at 
home instead? 
B Sceptical:   I don’t believe in this media hype about needing to take care of 
your health. 
C Disciplined:  You should get up before work and jog three times a week for at 
least 40 minutes. 
D Relaxed:  Don’t worry about getting in shape, you only live once! 
 
I will play for Ashley.  Which answer would Ashley give based upon their Set A 
personality trait?” 
Place an answer counter in position. 
 
When ready SAY:  “Once yours and Ashley’s counters are in the middle of the 
table faced down, you can turn them over to reveal your answers.” 
 
SAY: “Why did you think answer X was in line with Ashley’s set A personality 
trait?” 
 
 
 
3.5.  Present Card 8 and SAY:  “This one is about what you would do.  Ashley 
says to you: ‘[participant name], I think I might need to cancel my plans with a 
friend I am seeing later, because I don’t want to drink alcohol. 
 
Ashley, now knowing a bit about your personality will now guess what you are 
going to do’ 
 
Based on your Set B personality trait [point to personality cards], which one of 
these answers should you give? 
 
When you have made your decision, please place counter A, B, C or D on the 
table face down” 
 
The options below will be presented to the participant on a card without the 
personality trait labels  
   
A Sensitive:  I can understand why you don’t want to go, there is a lot of 
pressure to drink these days. 
B Strict:  If they are making you drink, when you do not want to, do not be 
friends with them. 
152 
 
C Curious:  What’s the worst that could happen?  Go out and see if you could 
have some fun! 
D Pragmatic:  Why don’t you suggest some non-drinking things you could do 
with your friend instead? 
 
I will play for Ashley, and will have a guess on what you will do based upon your 
Set B personality trait.”  Place an answer counter in position. 
 
Once yours and Ashley’s counters are in the middle of the table faced down, you 
can turn them over to reveal your answers.” 
 
SAY: “Why did you think answer X was in line with your set B personality trait?” 
 
 
 
3.6.  Present Card 9 and SAY: “This one is about what Ashley would do. You say 
to Ashley: ‘I have some free tickets to this horror film – would you like to see it 
with me?’ 
 
Look at these options [point to response options and allow a few moments to 
read] and tell me, based on Ashley’s Set C personality trait [point to personality 
cards], which of these answers would Ashley give? 
 
When you have made your decision, please place counter A, B, C or D on the 
table face down”  
 
The options below will be presented to the participant on a card without the 
personality trait labels  
 
A Extroverted:  Sure! And shall we see who else is free to join us? 
B Introverted:  I would prefer to wait until it is out on DVD, that way we can stop 
it if it gets too intense 
C Gentle:   That’s really kind, thank you.  But is it ok with you if I leave if I get too 
scared? 
D Autonomous:  Thank you, but I would rather pay to see this other film, and 
then meet you afterward? 
 
I will play for Ashley.  Which answer would Ashley give based upon their Set C 
personality trait?” 
Place an answer counter in position. 
 
Once yours and Ashley’s counters are in the middle of the table faced down, you 
can turn them over to reveal your answers.” 
 
SAY: “Why did you think answer X was in line with Ashley’s set C personality 
trait?” 
 
4.  Chapter 3 
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SAY:  “Now, in Chapter 3, you will be presented with situations in which you and 
Ashley will need to make decisions together.  You will play for yourself, and I will 
play for Ashley.   
Ready?  Let’s begin.” 
 
 
4.1. Present Card 10 and SAY: “Ashley says to you: ‘It looks like someone has 
dropped a wallet on the floor, what should we do about it?’ 
 
Look at these options [point to response options and allow examinee a few 
moments to read] and tell me, based upon yours and Ashley’s A and B 
personality traits, which of these answers would both make you happy? 
 
When you have made your decision, please place counter A, B, C or D on the 
table face down” 
 
 
A Sincere and Disciplined:  We need do the honest thing and hand it in 
immediately to the police, let me organise a route that we can take. 
B Sceptical and Relaxed:  If they were clumsy enough to drop it, I doubt they 
will go to the effort of contacting the police.  If they come back to look, they will 
find it. 
C Sensitive and Pragmatic:  Oh no, how horrible! They must be so worried!  
Let’s leave a note here to say that we have taken it to the nearest police station. 
D Strict and Curious:   How careless! What sort of person just drops a wallet? 
Let’s check to see if there are any contact details inside. 
 
I will play for Ashley.  Which answer would Ashley choose based upon their 
personality and what they know about you?”   Place an answer counter in 
position. 
 
Once yours and Ashley’s counters are in the middle of the table faced down, you 
can turn them over to reveal your answers.” 
 
SAY: “Why did you think answer X would make you and Ashley happy?” 
 
 
4.2. Present Card 11 and SAY: “You say to Ashley: ‘A lot of people seem to be 
having fun over there and don’t seem to mind random people joining in. Should 
we crash the party?’ 
 
Look at these options [point to response options and allow examinee a few 
moments to read] and tell me, based upon yours and Ashley’s A and B 
personality traits, which response would both make you happy? 
 
When you have made your decision, please place counter A, B, C or D on the 
table face down” 
 
A Extroverted and Autonomous:  Yeah, let’s party! How about one of us goes 
over on our own first to see if it is worth joining? 
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B Sincere and Relaxed:  We should probably ask if we can join, we can then 
take it easy for the rest of the night. 
C Introverted and Gentle:   Wouldn’t it be more fun to spend time together? But, 
I’m happy to do my own thing if you would rather go? 
D Sceptical and Disciplined:   No way. We wouldn’t be welcome! I’d rather we 
wait to go to a party that we’d been invited to attend. 
 
I will play for Ashley.  Which answer would Ashley choose based upon their 
personality and what they know about you?”   Place an answer counter in 
position. 
 
Once yours and Ashley’s counters are in the middle of the table faced down, you 
can turn them over to reveal your answers.” 
 
SAY: “Why did you think answer X would make you and Ashley happy?” 
 
4.3. Present Card 12 and SAY: “Ashley says to you:  ‘There are lots of activities 
on around here this weekend.  Shall we do something?’ 
 
Look at these options [point to response options and allow examinee a few 
moments to read] and tell me, based upon yours and Ashley’s B and C 
personality traits, which of these answers would both make you happy? 
 
When you have made your decision, please place counter A, B, C or D on the 
table face down” 
 
 
A Sensitive and Curious:   That’s so kind of you to ask.  I think I would like to do 
something I have never tried before. 
B Strict and Pragmatic:   Possibly:  I could see what’s available, we can then 
both look at some of the options before deciding. 
C Extroverted and Autonomous:  Great - I am planning to join a new sports 
club at the weekend, would you like to come along too? 
D Introverted and Gentle:  Maybe we could go somewhere together for a chat 
over some tea, then see what we feel like doing afterwards? 
 
I will play for Ashley.  Which answer would Ashley choose based upon their 
personality and what they know about you?”   Place an answer counter in 
position. 
 
Once yours and Ashley’s counters are in the middle of the table faced down, you 
can turn them over to reveal your answers.” 
 
SAY: “Why did you think answer X would make you and Ashley happy?” 
 
 
4.4.  Present Card 13 and SAY: “You say to Ashley: ‘A mutual friend has asked to 
borrow a large sum of money from us. How should we respond?’ 
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Look at these options [point to response options and allow examinee a few 
moments to read] and tell me, based upon yours and Ashley’s A and B 
personality traits, which of these answers could you both agree upon? 
 
When you have made your decision, please place counter A, B, C or D on the 
table face down” 
 
The options below will be presented to the participant on a card without the 
personality trait labels  
 
A Sincere and Disciplined:  I think we need to be honest about our concerns, 
but maybe we could set up a weekly payback arrangement. 
B Sceptical and Relaxed:  I’m not sure what this money is for, and I doubt they 
will pay us back; but let’s help them out if they need it. 
C Sensitive and Pragmatic:   How horrible they are in trouble like this. Let’s 
meet with them to help think of practical ways they can manage their money. 
D Strict and Curious:   This should not be our problem.  I wonder why they need 
the money? We should find out how they will pay it back before deciding. 
 
I will play for Ashley.  Which answer would Ashley choose based upon their 
personality and what they know about you?”   Place an answer counter in 
position. 
 
Once yours and Ashley’s counters are in the middle of the table faced down, you 
can turn them over to reveal your answers.” 
 
SAY: “Why did you think you and Ashley could both agree upon answer X?” 
 
4.5. Present Card 14 and SAY: “Ashley says to you: ‘A mutual friend is having 
trouble with their flatmate and needs somewhere to stay for a few nights. How 
should we respond?’ 
 
Look at these options [point to response options and allow examinee a few 
moments to read] and tell me, based upon yours and Ashley’s A and C 
personality traits, which of these answers could you both agree upon? 
 
When you have made your decision, please place counter A, B, C or D on the 
table face down” 
 
The options below will be presented to the participant on a card without the 
personality trait labels  
 
A Extroverted and Autonomous:   The more the merrier! I will invite them to 
stay with me; and we can see if we can get them to fix the problem. 
B Sincere and Relaxed:  We should give them a chance to talk about what has 
happened, life’s too short to get stressed about drama. 
C Introverted and Autonomous:   Personally, I don’t like drama, and this would 
make things very crowded, let’s stay out of it. 
D Sceptical and Disciplined:   Am not sure all this is necessary.  How is it going 
to work?  I think there should be ground rules about how long this is for. 
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I will play for Ashley.  Which answer would Ashley choose based upon their 
personality and what they know about you?”   Place an answer counter in 
position. 
 
Once yours and Ashley’s counters are in the middle of the table faced down, you 
can turn them over to reveal your answers.” 
 
SAY: “Why did you think you and Ashley could both agree upon answer X?” 
 
 
 
4.6.  Present Card 15 and SAY: “You say to Ashley ‘Look over there, there is a 3-
year-old child playing in the road and there seem to be no adults nearby. What 
should we do?’ 
 
Look at these options [point to response options and allow examinee a few 
moments to read] and tell me, based upon yours and Ashley’s B and C 
personality traits, which of these answers could you both agree upon? 
 
When you have made your decision, please place counter A, B, C or D on the 
table face down” 
 
The options below will be presented to the participant on a card without the 
personality trait labels  
 
A Sensitive and Curious:   Oh no! I hope the child is OK. How has a child been 
left alone like that?  Let’s see if we can find out what’s happening. 
B Strict and Pragmatic:  The parents should be more responsible! Let’s go over 
and make sure the child gets out of the road. 
C Extroverted and Autonomous:  Oh yes, I’ll go over and say hello; we’ll see if 
we can find the parents and take their child back to them. 
D Introverted and Gentle:  Let’s be careful that we don’t upset anybody.  Let’s 
watch for cars while we look to see if anyone’s around. 
 
I will play for Ashley.  Which answer would Ashley choose based upon their 
personality and what they know about you?”   Place an answer counter in 
position. 
 
Once yours and Ashley’s counters are in the middle of the table faced down, you 
can turn them over to reveal your answers.” 
 
SAY: “Why did you think you and Ashley could both agree upon answer X?” 
 
 
5.  Game End 
 
SAY: Now the game has ended, I would like to ask you some further questions: 
 
1. How did you find thinking about both yours and Ashley's perspectives? 
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2. How did The Friendship Game compare to Strange Stories as a reflection of 
social interaction scenarios? 
 
3. How did The Friendship Game compare to making friends is real life? 
 
4. Do you have any suggestions of what might improve The Friendship Game as 
a measure of Social Cognition 
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Appendix 2: TFG Record Form 
 
Personality Chosen 
 
Sincere A1  Sensitive B1  Extroverted C1 
Sceptical A2  Strict B2  Introverted C2 
Disciplined A3  Curious B3  Gentle C3 
Relaxed A4  Pragmatic B4  Autonomous C4 
 
 
Item Response Scoring 
  1.  Ashley’s Birthday A    B    C    D Match Y or N 
Rationale: 
  2.  Ashley’s tattoo A    B    C    D Match Y or N 
Rationale: 
  3.  Perfect Friday night A    B    C    D Match Y or N 
Rationale: 
  4.  Bank Meeting Preparation A    B    C    D Match Y or N 
Rationale: 
  5.  Person Falls Over A    B    C    D Match Y or N 
Rationale: 
  6.  Buying New Clothes A    B    C    D Match Y or N 
Rationale: 
  7.  Gym Alternatives  A    B    C    D Match Y or N 
Rationale: 
  8.  Not Drinking Alcohol A    B    C    D Match Y or N 
Rationale: 
  9.  Free Film Tickets A    B    C    D Match Y or N 
Rationale: 
10.  Dropped Wallet A    B    C    D Match Self Y or N Match Ashley Y or N 
Rationale: 
11.  Crash a Party A    B    C    D Match Self Y or N Match Ashley Y or N 
Rationale: 
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12.  Weekend Activities A    B    C    D Match Self Y or N Match Ashley Y or N 
Rationale: 
13.  Loan Money to a Friend A    B    C    D Match Self Y or N Match Ashley Y or N 
Rationale: 
14.  Flatmate Trouble A    B    C    D Match Self Y or N Match Ashley Y or N 
Rationale: 
15.  Child in the Street A    B    C    D Match Self Y or N Match Ashley Y or N 
Rationale: 
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Appendix 3: Personality Traits 
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Appendix 4:  Counters 
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Appendix 5: Game Chapter One 
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Appendix 6: Game Chapter Two 
 
 
Participant version - without prompts 
 
 
 
 
Researcher version - with answers 
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Appendix 7: Game Chapter Three 
 
Training Round and Researcher version with answers 
 
 
 
Participant version – without prompts 
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Appendix 8: Game Apparatus 
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Appendix 9: Presentation  
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Appendix 10:  UEL Ethical Approval 
 
School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
 
NOTICE OF ETHICS REVIEW DECISION  
 
For research involving human participants 
BSc/MSc/MA/Professional Doctorates in Clinical, Counselling and Educational 
Psychology 
 
 
REVIEWER: Ian Wells 
 
SUPERVISOR: Matthew Jones Chesters     
 
STUDENT: Maria Smithers      
 
Course: Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
 
Title of proposed study: Developing a Novel Measure of Theory-of-Mind: The 
Friendship Game  
 
DECISION OPTIONS:  
 
1. APPROVED: Ethics approval for the above named research study has been granted from 
the date of approval (see end of this notice) to the date it is submitted for 
assessment/examination. 
 
2. APPROVED, BUT MINOR AMENDMENTS ARE REQUIRED BEFORE THE RESEARCH 
COMMENCES (see Minor Amendments box below): In this circumstance, re-submission 
of an ethics application is not required but the student must confirm with their supervisor 
that all minor amendments have been made before the research commences. Students 
are to do this by filling in the confirmation box below when all amendments have been 
attended to and emailing a copy of this decision notice to her/his supervisor for their 
records. The supervisor will then forward the student’s confirmation to the School for its 
records.  
 
3. NOT APPROVED, MAJOR AMENDMENTS AND RE-SUBMISSION REQUIRED (see 
Major Amendments box below): In this circumstance, a revised ethics application must be 
submitted and approved before any research takes place. The revised application will be 
reviewed by the same reviewer. If in doubt, students should ask their supervisor for support 
in revising their ethics application.  
 
DECISION ON THE ABOVE-NAMED PROPOSED RESEARCH STUDY 
(Please indicate the decision according to one of the 3 options above) 
 
APPROVED, BUT MINOR AMENDMENTS ARE REQUIRED BEFORE THE RESEARCH 
COMMENCES 
 
 
 
Minor amendments required (for reviewer): 
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No real need for an amendment, more a comment on the second prediction being a ‘null-
hypothesis’. I wonder if rather than this being a formal hypothesis it might be better as 
some form of pre-test of the validity of the intervention i.e. ‘Any correlation between 
Satisfaction Scores within the Friendship Game and score of General Ability’ would 
suggest issues with the validity of the intervention’ 
 
NO NEED FOR AN AMENDMENT TO THE FORM, JUST SOMETHING TO CONSIDER 
 
 
Major amendments required (for reviewer): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Confirmation of making the above minor amendments (for students): 
 
I have noted and made all the required minor amendments, as stated above, before 
starting my research and collecting data. 
 
Student’s name (Typed name to act as signature): Maria Smithers  
Student number: u1725738   
 
Date: 27/03/2020 
 
(Please submit a copy of this decision letter to your supervisor with this box completed, if 
minor amendments to your ethics application are required) 
 
 
        
ASSESSMENT OF RISK TO RESEACHER (for reviewer) 
 
Has an adequate risk assessment been offered in the application form? 
 
YES / NO  
 
Please request resubmission with an adequate risk assessment 
 
If the proposed research could expose the researcher to any of kind of emotional, 
physical or health and safety hazard? Please rate the degree of risk: 
 
 
HIGH 
 
Please do not approve a high risk application and refer to the Chair of Ethics. Travel to 
countries/provinces/areas deemed to be high risk should not be permitted and an 
application not approved on this basis. If unsure please refer to the Chair of Ethics. 
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MEDIUM (Please approve but with appropriate recommendations) 
 
LOW 
 
 
 
 
Reviewer comments in relation to researcher risk (if any).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reviewer (Typed name to act as signature):    Ian Wells 
 
Date:  12/11/19 
 
This reviewer has assessed the ethics application for the named research study on behalf of the 
School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCHER PLEASE NOTE: 
 
For the researcher and participants involved in the above named study to be covered by 
UEL’s Insurance, prior ethics approval from the School of Psychology (acting on behalf 
of the UEL Research Ethics Committee), and confirmation from students where minor 
amendments were required, must be obtained before any research takes place.  
 
 
For a copy of UELs Personal Accident & Travel Insurance Policy, please see the 
Ethics Folder in the Psychology Noticeboard 
  
 
X 
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Appendix 11: Information Sheet 
School of Psychology 
Information Sheet 
Version 29.09.19 
 
 
 
The Principal Investigator 
Name: Maria Smithers 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
School of Psychology 
Email: u1725738@uel.ac.uk 
 
Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
The purpose of this page is to provide you with the information that you need to 
consider in deciding whether to participate in this research study. 
 
DEVELOPING A NOVEL MEASURE OF THEORY-OF-MIND:  
THE FRIENDSHIP GAME 
 
Project Description 
Theory of Mind (ToM) is how we understand the beliefs, ideas and intentions of 
others. Research has found that challenges with ToM are characteristic of the 
social communication and interaction difficulties experienced by those within the 
ASD population. However, methods of understanding ToM abilities are largely 
limited to younger populations.  
The current research aims to develop a novel approach to understanding ToM in 
adults with ASD. To do this, we have applied a game-like interactive design, to 
make it more representative of the complexity of real life scenarios. The measure 
will be titled ‘The Friendship Game’. This is due to its creation of scenarios where 
two friends strive to reach an agreement upon a posed question or decision in 
order to maximise their friendship satisfaction.  
In order to assess whether this new measure works; the research will be comparing 
it against existing measures as well as controlling for general ability levels through 
the use of neuropsychological tests. It is therefore estimated that participation in 
the study will take approximately an hour and a half to complete.  
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We hope that The Friendship Game captures some of the difficulties experienced 
by Adults with ASD in everyday social interactions. If successful, it is hoped that 
the game can be used to develop a method of measuring ToM in adults that 
captures everyday challenges.  
 
Confidentiality of the Data 
Confidentiality will be ensured, all personal, questionnaire and test data will be 
anonymous and only identifiable by a unique participant code (your initials followed 
by month and year of birth i.e. AB, MM/YY).  On closing the online study all data 
will be downloaded and stored on a password protected computer only accessible 
by the research team, for 10 years, in line with Research Councils UK (RCUK) 
guidance, after which data will be destroyed and all files deleted. Group data will 
be used for publication and/or dissemination, but no individual data will be 
identifiable.   
Data Protection 
The data collected from the questionnaires, tests and measures within this study 
will be entered on to a secure UEL server using encrypted software: SPSS. To 
back up the data securely, it will only be saved into the UEL One Drive folder.  
Location 
 
This will either take place at UEL Stratford campus, at your home or at another 
agreed location, for example, a spare room within a local charity or an interview 
room in an NHS service. 
Disclaimer 
You are not obliged to take part in this study, and are free to withdraw at any time 
during the study. If you chose to withdraw your questionnaire and test data after 
returning/submitting it simply email the research team providing them with your 
participant code (as indicated earlier) requesting to withdraw your data from the 
study.  Should you choose to withdraw from the programme you may do so without 
disadvantage to yourself and without any obligation to give a reason. 
If you have any questions or concerns about how the study has been conducted, 
please contact my supervisor  
Name: Dr Matthew Jones Chester School of Psychology, University of East 
London, Water Lane, London E15 4LZ. 020 8223 4082 
Email:  
m.h.jones-chesters@uel.ac.uk 
or   
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Chair of the School of Psychology Research Ethics Sub-committee: Dr. Mary 
Spiller, School of Psychology, University of East London, Water Lane, London E15 
4LZ.  
(Tel: 020 8223 4004. Email: m.j.spiller@uel.ac.uk) 
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Appendix 12: Information Sheet 
 
School of Psychology 
 
Consent Form 
Version 29.09.19 
 
 
Consent Form for Participation in the Research Study 
 
Researcher:   
Supervised by:  
 
 
          Please initial 
box 
 
1.  I confirm that I have read and understood the information provided; 
     I understand what the study is about, how it is being done, and why. 
 
2.  I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw 
     at any time, without giving any reason, and without any consequences. 
 
3.  I agree to short quotes from my answers being used in the write-up 
     of this study, and that my anonymity will still be protected at all times. 
 
4.  I give permission for the individuals named above, and examiners at  
     the university to have access to the data generated by my participation. 
 
5.  I voluntarily consent to take part in the above study  
     and consent to the audiotaping of my answers. 
 
 
I agree to the terms. 
Respondent’s name (print): 
 ……………………………………..…………………. 
Respondent’s signature:  
 ……………………………………..…………………. 
Date:     
 ……………………………………..…………………. 
 
I agree to the terms: 
Researcher’s name (print):  
 ……………………………………..…………………. 
Researcher’s signature:  
 ……………………………………..…………………. 
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Date:     
 ……………………………………..…………………. 
 
 
 
I have received the sum of £ ………….  Signature:
 ……………………………….. 
in payment of expenses.    Date: 
 ……………………………….. 
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Appendix 13: Recruitment Poster 
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Appendix 14: Excerpt from Research Reflection Diary 
 
The participant was keen to support the study and engage in the measures. It 
appeared that ‘doing well’ was important to them.  I felt encouraged to see that I 
was observing their ‘best’ performance, as this is an important factor in TFG’s 
validation. However, I was concerned the participant’s drive to ‘do well’ may also 
be a consequence of their fear of judgement or stigma related to not performing 
to a level they had hoped. In the position of researcher, I also noticed myself at 
times feeling excited if they performed to a high level on a particular subtest. This 
reminded me that despite striving to adopt a neutral position, I too am a product 
of my social context where I have been conditioned to place a lot of value on 
assessment. It was therefore important to hold in mind both the memory and 
observation of being measured, and the power held in position of the researcher 
conducting the tests. I was pleased to see that introducing TFG created a 
different testing atmosphere. Whilst there remained a desire to do well, the 
participant appeared more relaxed and willing to share their thoughts on the 
process. As the researcher, I also felt that was able to quickly gain a greater 
sense of the participant’s experience, thought processes and social interaction 
skills.  
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Appendix 15: A personal reflection on the study aims and process 
The experience of developing and testing TFG was an enjoyable and creative 
process. Adopting the game-like design offered the freedom to experiment with a 
format that was more complex than existing social cognitive measures. A 
personal goal of this endeavour was to create a social cognitive measure that 
was fun and engaging, rather than stigmatising and/or resulting in a foreboding 
sense of pass or failure. It is believed that the verbal answer-response element of 
TFG helped to achieve this through balancing the power dynamic between the 
researcher and the participant, whilst also measuring ToM. In addition to this, it is 
promising to see that the results offered early support for TFG being used as a 
social intervention for adults with HF ASD who seek support with communication 
and interaction skills.  
 
The more challenging experiences from the research process were due to the 
difficulties in recruitment. Beyond the time limits of a thesis, many Autism 
charities responded to recruitment e-mails and phone calls expressing that their 
services were very busy. Many of these services also stated that they had 
received a lot of recruitment interest from Autism researchers seeking to 
advertise their studies. As such, they were cautious about over-burdening their 
service users with research advertisements, especially if they were not being 
paid. In addition to this, the span of time to recruit participants to the study was 
cut short owing to the UK government lockdown measures in response to the 
Covid-19 pandemic.   
 
 
